




The Myth of Creditor Sabotage 
Vincent S.J. Buccola,† Jameson K. Mah,†† & Tai Zhang‡ 
Since credit derivatives began to substantially influence financial markets a 
decade ago, rumors have circulated about so-called “net-short” creditors who seek to 
damage promising, albeit financially distressed, companies. A recent episode pitting 
the hedge fund Aurelius against broadband provider Windstream is widely sup-
posed to be a case in point and has at once fueled calls for law reform and yielded 
an effigy of ostensible Wall Street predation. 
This Article argues that creditor sabotage is a myth. Net-short strategies work, 
if at all, by in effect burning money. When an activist creditor shows its cards, as all 
activists must eventually do, it also reveals an opportunity for others to profit by 
thwarting the activist’s plans and saving threatened surplus. We discuss three 
sources of liquidity that targeted firms could tap to block a saboteur—“net-long” de-
rivatives speculators, the target’s own investors, and bankruptcy. We conclude that 
it is exceedingly difficult for creditors to make money hobbling debtors and that there 
is little reason to believe anyone tries. We then examine the Windstream case and 
find, consistent with our theory, that the strongest reason for thinking Aurelius 
aimed at sabotage—namely that everyone says so—is weak indeed. Our analysis 
suggests that calls for law reform are addressed to a nonexistent or, at worst, self-
correcting problem. Precisely for this reason, however, the persistent appeal of the 
sabotage myth is a lesson in political rhetoric. A story needn’t be true for some to find 
it useful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A basic assumption in the standard paradigm of corporate fi-
nance is that a company’s investors want the company to succeed. 
To be sure, investors of different classes—stockholders and bond-
holders, for example—bear risk and reward unequally.1 Conflict 
over corporate policy is thus sometimes inevitable. But misa-
ligned interests, however fraught they may be in a given case, are 
a second-order detail in the standard paradigm. The fundamental 
fact is that a company’s investors all do better if the business 
thrives, and the various rights investors are given to influence 
 
 1 See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305, 334 (1976). There is 
nothing special in this regard about the equity-debt distinction. Any two investments with 
distinctive priority or maturity profiles can yield conflict. See, for example, Kenneth M. 
Ayotte and Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J Legal 
Analysis 511, 526 (2009). 
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corporate activity reflect their common aim as much as their dis-
tinctive interests.2 
The rapid growth of derivatives contracting during the first 
decade of the millennium threatened this basic assumption’s con-
tinued validity. Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black, among 
others, noticed that derivatives could be used to decouple inves-
tors’ governance rights from their economic stake in a company’s 
fate.3 Credit derivatives—financial contracts with payoffs that 
are linked to, or derive from, the value of one or more companies’ 
debt obligations—appeared to give rise to a troubling dynamic. 
Creditors who place a sufficiently large bet against their own 
loans or bonds stand to profit from the debtor’s failure. For “net-
short” creditors, failure means a derivative payoff more than suf-
ficient to offset a loss on the underlying investment. Almost as 
soon as credit derivatives became widely traded, some of the legal 
academy’s leading lights identified a perverse possibility. Nothing 
stood in the way of a net-short activist using its governance rights 
as a creditor to bring ruin on the debtor—to reduce its value and 
prompt default.4 
 
 2 See, for example, George G. Triantis and Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in 
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 Cal L Rev 1073, 1078–79 (1995) (discussing comple-
mentarity of shareholder and creditor governance rights). 
 3 See Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty 
Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U Pa L Rev 625, 632–33 (2008); Henry T.C. Hu 
and Bernard Black, Debt, Equity and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and Systemic Risk 
Implications, 14 Eur Fin Mgmt 663, 664–66 (2008); Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black, 
Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty 
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J Corp Fin 343, 344 (2007); Henry T.C. Hu 
and Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Own-
ership, 79 S Cal L Rev 811, 815 (2006). 
 4 See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 Yale L J 
648, 651 (2010) (noting that in the modern investment paradigm “failure of the business 
can mean large returns to some creditors”); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: 
The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L Rev 115, 
167–69 (2009) (discussing perversity of an “overhedged” creditor who “would profit from 
the borrower’s default”); Hu and Black, 156 U Pa L Rev at 731, 734 (cited in note 3) (noting 
that a creditor with “negative net economic ownership” has “an incentive to . . . reduce the 
value of the debt class it holds”); Stephen J. Lubben, Credit Derivatives and the Future of 
Chapter 11, 81 Am Bankr L J 405, 427–28 (2007) (indicating that “as maturity dates ap-
proach on outstanding credit default swaps, protected creditors will have an increasing 
disincentive to work with the debtor”); Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel Jr, The Promise 
and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U Cin L Rev 1019, 1034–35 (2007) (explaining that “a 
lender that has purchased credit default swaps may have an incentive to use its position 
as a lender to affirmatively destroy value”). 
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A recent episode pitting the telecommunications company 
Windstream Services against the hedge fund Aurelius has crys-
tallized anxiety about net-short sabotage.5 In 2017, two years after 
Windstream spun off certain real estate assets, Aurelius concluded 
that the transaction had violated a covenant in one of the com-
pany’s note indentures. The notes were now trading at a discount, 
and Aurelius promptly bought enough so that, under the terms of 
the indenture, it could demand immediate repayment of the 
notes’ full principal amount. Aurelius won a judgment ordering 
exactly that.6 Soon thereafter, Windstream tumbled into bank-
ruptcy seemingly unprepared for the contingency.7 
But why did Aurelius litigate? Debt-market observers were 
unequivocal about the fund’s motivations. “[E]veryone,” Matt Lev-
ine reported, “assumes that Aurelius [ ] owned a lot of credit de-
fault swaps on Windstream [ ] that would pay out if Windstream 
defaulted on its debt.”8 That is, the consensus has Aurelius aim-
ing at and wreaking havoc. One observer situating the case in a 
broader context has nicely summarized anxiety about the status 
quo: “Real people’s jobs in real companies—13,000 of them at-risk 
at Windstream—are being lost as a result of [derivatives] chican-
ery.”9 
Net-short creditor activism has been a hot topic in Wind-
stream’s wake.10 Law reform is in the air. Proposals to enhance 
 
 5 Disclosure: One of us (Buccola) has represented Aurelius in litigation. He has had 
no affiliation with it or its principals since 2012, however, and this Article reflects no non-
public information about Aurelius’s investments or decisions. 
 6 See US Bank National Association v Windstream Services, LLC, 2019 WL 948120 
*22–23 (SDNY). 
 7 See Declaration of Tony Thomas, Chief Executive Officer and President of Wind-
stream Holdings, Inc., (I) In Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Mo-
tions and (II) Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, In re Windstream Holdings, Inc, 
No 19-22312, *2, 5 (Bankr SDNY filed Feb 25, 2019) (Thomas Declaration). 
 8 Matt Levine, Maybe Companies Will Get Rid of CDS (Bloomberg, May 23, 2019) 
(emphasis in original), online at https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-05-23/ 
maybe-companies-will-get-rid-of-cds (visited July 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
See also, for example, Henry T.C. Hu, Corporate Distress, Credit Default Swaps, and De-
faults: Information and Traditional, Contingent, and Empty Creditors, 13 Brooklyn J 
Corp, Fin & Comm L 5, 28 (2018) (noting that debt decoupling “helps explain Aurelius’s 
behavior”). 
 9 Martin Hutchinson, The Bear’s Lair: Time to Close Down the CDS Market (True 
Blue Will Never Stain, Mar 4, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/TSR9-P7NP. 
 10 See, for example, John Williams, James Warbey, Ben Kastner, and Elizabeth A. 
Martinez, Net Short Lender Disenfranchisement: Is the New Anti-CDS Vaccine Safe and 
Effective? *1 (Milbank, June 11, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/NA9W-FCG7 (noting 
that the Windstream bankruptcy “has rekindled market participants’ concerns over the 
effects of so-called ‘net short debt activism’”). 
2020] The Myth of Creditor Sabotage 2033 
 
creditors’ disclosure obligations and to strip governance rights 
from conflicted investors are being seriously aired, and experi-
ments are underway.11 But although Windstream has become a 
focal point for indignation and a catalyst of policy analysis, it is 
only that. Worries about the influence of net-short creditors and 
their cousins—so-called “empty” creditors12—have circulated for 
more than a decade.13 The same concerns continue to inform edu-
cated projections of the future. Prominent restructuring lawyers 
at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, for example, have issued a 
series of memoranda warning about what they call “The Rise of 
the Net-Short Debt Activist.”14 The fate of a single broadband pro-
vider is not the main issue. The issue is instead a sense that sophis-
ticated funds are willing and able to wreck financially distressed 
but fundamentally promising businesses—a vision of the debt mar-
kets as a playground for investment advisers but “a disaster for 
everyone else.”15 
Despite the earnestness of scholars’ and market participants’ 
concerns, however, we argue in this Article that creditor sabotage 
is a myth. Sabotage is best understood, we contend, as a kind of 
 
 11 Some loans now feature what are being called “Windstream Provisions.” See Todd 
Koretzky, Anti-Net Short Provisions in Syndicated Credit Facilities *1 (Allen & Overy, 
Sept 3, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/VT6Y-GH87. For further discussion, see note 
180 and accompanying text. 
 12 An “empty” creditor has fully hedged its investment in the debtor but is not short. 
For further discussion, see note 50 and accompanying text. 
 13 See, for example, Edward J. Janger and Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: 
Mark-to-Market Governance in Bankruptcy, 104 Iowa L Rev 1857, 1871–72 (2019) (sum-
marizing representative rumors). Professors Edward Janger and Adam Levitin report that 
hedged creditors have been “a driving force in the run-up to many of the most contested 
bankruptcies of recent years.” Id at 1871. 
 14 Joshua A. Feltman, Emil A. Kleinhaus, and John R. Sobolewski, The Rise of the 
Net-Short Debt Activist (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, Aug 7, 
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YD6H-YKJY. See also Joshua A. Feltman, Emil A. 
Kleinhaus, and John R. Sobolewski, Debt Default Activism: After Windstream, the Winds 
of Change (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, June 18, 2019), archived 
at https://perma.cc/G3JA-X6PV; Eric M. Rosof, Gregory E. Pessin, Michael S. Benn, Tijana 
J. Dvornic, and John R. Sobolewski, Wachtell Lipton Looks at Acquisition Financing in 
2017 and the Year Ahead (The CLS Blue Sky Blog, Jan 17, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/KGR5-R3P5; Steven A. Cohen, Emil A. Kleinhaus, and John R. Sob-
olewski, Default Activism in the Debt Market (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate 
Governance, Dec 4, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/J4HE-XNZY. 
 15 William D. Cohan, What Hedge Funds Consider a Win Is a Disaster for Everyone 
Else (NY Times, May 12, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/KC8L-TZ9C. 
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urban legend, a cautionary story in wide circulation but of dubi-
ous plausibility and lacking a basis in observable fact.16 The obvi-
ous upshot, if we are right, is to cast doubt on the value of respon-
sive law reform. But our conclusion also yields more general 
insights about corporate legal theory and economic rhetoric.17 
Our reasoning starts with an observation about the nature of 
creditor governance. Creditors rarely exert direct control. In-
stead, they influence corporate activity indirectly through a cred-
ible threat to withdraw capital if the debtor will not behave. Cov-
enants on their face restrict the debtor, but they bind in fact only 
to the extent the debtor’s managers fear a reaction to breach. The 
power to accelerate a debtor’s repayment obligation is, in the end, 
a creditor’s biggest stick.18 If the debtor can refinance cheaply 
enough, it is no stick at all.19 
Net-short creditor sabotage must then work, if it works, by 
provoking a crisis of liquidity for the debtor. The saboteur must 
be able to produce a sudden inability to fund near-term operations 
that leads, in turn, to a loss of enterprise value and crashing debt 
prices. In other words, for a saboteur to succeed, it must be able 
to cut off the debtor’s access to cash just when cash is needed. But 
if in a given instance cash can preserve value, then there is, by 
definition, money to be made supplying it. The inner logic of net-
short sabotage thus implies the existence of one or more trades 
 
 16 Two recent papers document instances of short sellers performing what might be 
fairly called sabotage. See Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk, and Frank Partnoy, Negative 
Activism, 97 Wash U L Rev 1333, 1335–39, 1345–46 (2020); Joshua Mitts, Short and Dis-
tort *7–11 (Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No 592, Feb 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/4GGZ-6DYQ. We take no issue with their intriguing findings. But the 
saboteurs they discuss (with arguably one or two exceptions) are outsiders to the targeted 
firms. Their tactics do not include using governance rights conferred by investment in the 
targets. For this reason, the legal and theoretical issues implicated, while important, do 
not challenge the foundations of corporate governance as such. 
 17 In calling creditor sabotage a myth, we mean to say more than that it is literally 
false. We mean to say that the story, despite its lack of empirical foundation, seems to help 
market participants and critics “make sense” of their world. Two contemporaneously au-
thored papers explore in depth the power of mythmaking for corporate law and govern-
ance. See Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law Myths *7–9 (European Corporate Govern-
ance Institute Law Working Paper No 519, May 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/HTF7 
-2LQ8; Mark J. Roe and Roy Shapira, The Power of the Corporate Short-Termism Narra-
tive *4, 8–9 (unpublished manuscript, July 31, 2019) (on file with authors). We see a par-
allel between creditor sabotage and the short-termism story described by Professors Mark 
Roe and Roy Shapira. See note 197 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 Tulane L Rev 339, 
363 (2018); Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of 
Bondholder Rights, 103 Nw U L Rev 281, 302–04 (2009). 
 19 See Buccola, 93 Tulane L Rev at 363 (cited in note 18). 
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that others could make to block the saboteur and punish its am-
bitions. The problem with the sabotage story is not that it misap-
prehends net-short creditors’ incentives, but that it ignores eve-
ryone else’s.20 
The insight is straightforwardly Coasean.21 Our burden is to 
show that transaction costs are unlikely to prevent a company 
targeted for sabotage from procuring liquidity. To that end, we 
identify and discuss three sources of liquidity that financially dis-
tressed companies could be expected to tap in case of an at-
tempted sabotage: “net-long” derivatives speculators, the target’s 
investors (other than the saboteur itself), and bankruptcy.22 There 
is no guarantee that a deal to thwart net-short activism would be 
struck in any particular case. We conclude, however, that barriers 
to coordination are sufficiently modest relative to prospective ben-
efits that a deal ought generally to be expected. In particular, the 
greater the dislocation an activist’s tactics might cause (and so 
the more tempting sabotage might be to it), the more likely others 
are to frustrate the activist’s plans.23 Sophisticated investors, 
adept as they are at backward induction, are thus unlikely to bet 
on their own capacities for sabotage in the first instance.24 
To test our reasoning, we present a case study of Wind-
stream’s recent travails. Lacking access to Aurelius’s books, we 
can’t say definitively what the fund’s motivations were or are. But 
we show that publicly available data point not to sabotage at all, 
despite the consensus view. Instead, Aurelius seems to have tried 
to impose what is, in effect, a tax on Windstream’s covenant 
 
 20 For a parallel argument, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and 
Counterstrategies, 48 U Chi L Rev 263, 265–318 (1981) (criticizing predatory pricing the-
ories for parallel failure to account for likely reactions of the theory’s supposed victims). 
 21 See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960). 
 22 The role of net-long derivatives investors in particular has been almost uniformly 
ignored in popular as well as academic analysis. For one notable exception, see Yesha 
Yadav, The Case for a Market in Debt Governance, 67 Vand L Rev 771, 776, 805–14 (2014). 
Likewise, in a contemporaneously authored paper, Professors András Danis and Andrea 
Gamba have developed a useful, general model of the effects of credit insurance on reor-
ganization outcomes that incorporates the possibility of the insurers intervening. See An-
drás Danis and Andrea Gamba, Dark Knights: The Rise in Firm Intervention by CDS In-
vestors *7–24 (WBS Finance Group Research Paper No 265, Nov 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/62VZ-UV4R. 
 23 This observation suggests a reason why some credit-derivative machinations (such 
as engineered defaults and orphaning transactions)—but not sabotage—may work. For 
further discussion, see note 76. 
 24 If any do—and prevail—they should, we suggest, be regarded as lucky fools rather 
than strategic masterminds. 
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breach.25 To implement this strategy, Aurelius would have used 
credit derivatives, if at all, only to hedge economic exposure to 
Windstream’s business until the tax could be collected, not to bet 
on the company’s failure. Moreover, we conclude that if Aurelius 
really did profit from a net-short gambit, as the consensus holds, 
then a series of unforced (and ex ante unforeseeable) errors com-
mitted by Windstream and others after the fund made its litiga-
tion stance public was a but-for cause. 
One case study does not, of course, rule out net-short tactics 
as a general matter. No number of case studies can. But together 
with our theoretical argument, it should cause observers to ques-
tion their assumptions not only about Windstream, but about the 
plausibility of sabotage more generally. 
Our analysis has practical as well as theoretical implications. 
The principal policy implication is essentially negative. Advocates 
of law reform threaten to impose rules, such as enhanced disclo-
sure requirements, that may reduce debt-market liquidity and 
make borrowing more expensive. They do so on the basis of a bo-
geyman story and without clear evidence of a single case of cred-
itor sabotage. We argue that the lack of evidence is no accident, 
because the threat, so to speak, doesn’t exist or is, at worst, self-
correcting. This is not to say that the law as it stands is perfect, 
or to rule out any single proposal to alter creditors’ rights, 
whether in or out of bankruptcy. There may be sound reasons for 
change. But sabotage is not one. 
Our analysis also informs one of the central (if frequently un-
stated) live questions in bankruptcy and reorganization theory: 
Namely, what should be made of increasing complexity in capital 
markets and financial contracting? The relevant facts are not in dis-
pute. Debt markets today are much more liquid—and the players 
and techniques that constitute them much more sophisticated—
than even, say, two decades ago. But what do these trends mean 
for law? An optimistic view of private ordering sees the case for 
 
 25 See Yesha Yadav, Debt Buybacks and the Myth of Creditor Power *20–23 (Vander-
bilt Law Research Paper No 19-37, Feb 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/Q968-NCQL 
(discussing recent examples of lender oversight of defaults); Kahan and Rock, 103 Nw U 
L Rev at 284–306 (cited in note 18) (describing the generic strategy). The euphemistic term 
for the strategy in some distressed-debt circles is “covenant arbitrage.” See Lisa 
Abramowicz and Richard Bravo, Covenant Arbitrage Exploited in High-Yield Bonds: 
Credit Markets (Bloomberg, Mar 7, 2013), online at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2013-03-07/covenant-arbitrage-exploited-in-high-yield-bonds-credit-markets (vis-
ited July 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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distress-specific legal intervention, including bankruptcy, fad-
ing.26 The idea is that sophistication and liquidity point toward 
complete contracting, so investors increasingly can prevent and 
solve coordination problems on their own.27 A more pessimistic 
view holds, on the contrary, that complexity justifies a greater 
mandate for law to dispense with bargained-for terms.28 Complexity 
begets fragility, is the idea, so that intervention to repair the 
wreckage of private ordering may grow more important with 
time. The creditor sabotage myth, if it were true, would bolster 
this pessimistic view. The reasons the myth is false support the 
more optimistic view. 
One can zoom out even farther. The view from thirty thou-
sand feet suggests a question about the sabotage story’s appeal: 
Why does the story persist if it is theoretically dubious and lacks 
grounding in observation? Although we can only speculate, we 
suggest that the story serves useful functions for those who tell 
and hear it. For corporate managers, the story provides a ready 
explanation for executive failure. For distress investors, it serves 
as a totem of the industry’s ideals and a warning against incom-
petence. For members of the public, it embodies and expresses anx-
iety about the fragility of economic life and the willingness of finan-
ciers to take advantage of that fragility. As with any good piece of 
folklore, none of the story’s functions depends on it being true. 
I.  THE NET-SHORT CREDITOR SABOTAGE STORY 
Our claim is that net-short creditor sabotage is only a story. 
But it is a story, and an intriguing one at that—compelling 
enough if one doesn’t ask too many questions. This Part explains 
its logic. 
 
 26 See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan 
L Rev 751, 777–87 (2002). 
 27 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Distress, 114 Nw U L Rev 705, 713–19 (2019); Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Bankruptcy 
Firm, 167 U Pa L Rev Online 1, 5–8 (2019); Barry E. Adler, The Creditors’ Bargain Revis-
ited, 166 U Pa L Rev 1853, 1856–59 (2018); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Related Contract-
ing and Bankruptcy Functions *1–2, 27–28 (Yale Law and Economics Research Paper 
No 553, Oct 2017) (on file with authors). 
 28 See Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of 
Corporate Bankruptcy, Colum L Rev *1–4 (forthcoming), archived at 
https://perma.cc/79D4-3B3H; Robert K. Rasmussen and Michael Simkovic, Bounties for 
Errors: Market Testing Contracts, 10 Harv Bus L Rev 117, 148–51 (2020) (discussing the 
Hovnanian case in detail); Jared A. Ellias and Robert J. Stark, Bankruptcy Hardball, 108 
Cal L Rev 745, 784–86 (2020); Kenneth Ayotte, Disagreement and Capital Structure Com-
plexity, 49 J Legal Stud 1, 1–4 (2020). 
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The traditional picture of the debtor-creditor relationship is 
of an uneasy partnership. The parties have different interests. 
Debtors tend to tolerate more risk of loss, and creditors tend to be 
more cautious.29 They resolve conflict imperfectly with diplomacy 
and a formal debt contract that says who can end the relationship 
and on what terms. Still, debtor and creditor interests are roughly 
aligned. Everyone in the traditional picture is hoping for a profita-
ble business. 
The prospect of net-short creditor sabotage arises from a sub-
version of the traditional relationship. An investor can at once be-
come a company’s creditor—by buying a bond, say—and, with the 
help of a derivative contract, arrange to make money, on net, if 
the bond loses value and the debtor defaults. The net-short sabo-
teur is thus a villain who first arranges its affairs to create con-
flict with a company and then takes matters into its own hands. 
In outline, the story is that simple. To fully grasp its particu-
lars, however, one needs to understand also the terms of the rel-
evant contracts and the means of execution. In principle, there 
are a number of ways activists can establish a net-short position.30 
The most straightforward way, though, and by far the most 
widely alleged, is with credit default swaps (CDS). We therefore 
start by describing CDS and the market in which they trade and 
are settled. We then describe the incentives that a hedged or net-
short position established through CDS creates, and the kinds of 
tactics a net-short activist creditor might use to undermine its 
debtor. 
A. How CDS Work 
A credit default swap is a bilateral trade transferring from 
one party to another the credit risk of a third.31 The CDS was in-
vented in the 1990s as a way for banks to shed exposure to large 
borrowers’ default risk.32 Today a CDS is used mainly as a specu-
lative instrument, a convenient way to bet on changes in one or 
 
 29 See, for example, Jensen and Meckling, 3 J Fin Econ at 333–43 (cited in note 1). 
 30 See Janger and Levitin, 104 Iowa L Rev at 1878–83 (cited in note 13) (describing such 
mechanisms, including put options, total return swaps, and investment in a competitor). 
 31 The third party, known as the “reference entity,” can be a single debtor or a (syn-
thetic) basket of debtors. M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance”, 16 
Conn Ins L J 1, 11 (2009). Swaps written on just one debtor, known as “single-name” CDS, 
are of primary interest to us. 
 32 New Basel (international banking) regulations were the immediate impetus. See 
The Swaps Emperor’s New Clothes (The Economist, Feb 8, 2001), online at https:// 
www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2001/02/08/the-swaps-emperors-new-clothes? 
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more issuers’ credit quality. But to grasp the swap’s logic, it is 
easiest to consider it in the context of its original, insurance-like 
function—for a CDS resembles an insurance contract where the 
hazard insured against is a debt default instead of fire, flood, or 
the like.33 Party A (the “protection buyer”) pays B (the “protection 
seller”) an upfront sum and a quarterly premium in exchange for 
B’s obligation to pay A the difference between the par and market 
value of C’s debt if C (the “reference entity”) should default. 
To illustrate, consider how CDS can be used to create a per-
fect hedge of debt. Suppose that C issues a $1,000 face-value bond 
at par.34 A wants to buy the bond without bearing the risk that C 
will default. The answer is for A to go to B and buy a perfectly 
offsetting amount of CDS protection—in swap lingo, a $1,000 “no-
tional” amount. The trade will require A to pay B an upfront fee 
tailored to the circumstances of C’s bond plus a quarterly pre-
mium of 1.25 percent of the notional amount of the swap for the 
swap’s duration.35 
If the swap matures without incident, that’s the end of things. 
B takes home the upfront fee and quarterly premiums. But if C 
defaults, then B must make A whole for any loss it suffers from 
the default. Today, CDS settle mainly on a cash basis, with B pay-
ing A the notional amount of the swap times the difference be-
tween par and the bond’s value, as determined by an auction, at 
the time of default.36 For example, if after default C’s bond trades 
at 40 cents on the dollar, then B simply pays $600.37 
Creditors who buy CDS protection need not seek a perfect 
hedge. An investor with a given amount of a reference entity’s 
debt can tailor its exposure to the risk of default by adjusting the 
notional amount of protection it procures. For example, suppose 
that A wants only a partial hedge. If A wants to retain half of its 
 
zid=300&ah=e7b9370e170850b88ef129fa625b13c4 (visited July 13, 2020) (Perma archive 
unavailable). 
 33 Not that a CDS is “insurance” in the legal sense of the word. See, for example, 
Henderson, 16 Conn Ins L J at 22–55 (cited in note 31). 
 34 That is, for $1,000 today, C sells a promise to pay $1,000 at maturity. 
 35 There are two standard annualized coupon rates for CDS: 1 percent for invest-
ment-grade reference entities and 5 percent for high-yield reference entities. As a conse-
quence of this standardization, the market’s assessment of variables relating to a partic-
ular swap—interest rates, the reference entity’s current bond prices, and so on—are 
reflected entirely in the size of the upfront fee a protection buyer must pay. 
 36 See Rasmussen and Simkovic, 10 Harv Bus L Rev at 125–29 (cited in note 28) 
(describing and explaining the logic of the CDS auction mechanism). 
 37 ($1,000)*(1.00−0.40)=$600. 
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exposure to C’s credit risk, it buys $500 rather than $1,000 no-
tional of protection. Now if C defaults, B pays $300.38 In this case, 
A takes $700—greater than $400 (no protection) but less than 
$1,000 (perfect hedge). 
Credit default swaps are traded in a highly standardized and 
mediated market. In principle, any two investors could privately 
negotiate bespoke rules of exchange and settlement. In practice, 
a trade organization, the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), oversees the settlement of virtually all CDS.39 
ISDA’s form Master Agreement allows contractors to conclude a 
swap by specifying just a few rudimentary terms—the reference 
entity, the notional amount, the size of the upfront fee, and the 
like.40 
The prosaic ambiguities of CDS are difficult to encapsulate in 
a single set of rules. ISDA’s response to ambiguity has textual as 
well as institutional components. A swap terminates and obliges 
the protection seller to pay if the reference entity experiences a 
“credit event.”41 This category includes obvious markers of peril, 
most importantly “bankruptcy” and “failure to pay.”42 (Voluntary 
debt exchanges, even those effected as part of a general restruc-
turing, are not credit events for most North American compa-
nies—a point to which we shall return.)43 A committee composed 
of representatives of ISDA’s membership, the Determinations 
Committee, has the final say and oversees an auction of the ref-
erence entity’s debt instruments to establish the amount that pro-
tection sellers must pay in settlement. 
The CDS market is dealer based.44 Thousands of investors 
buy or sell protection on an annual basis, but the bulge bracket 
 
 38 ($500)*(1.00−0.40)=$300. 
 39 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, About ISDA, archived at 
https://perma.cc/W4LU-L3T8. 
 40 See generally International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Legal Guidelines 
for Smart Derivatives Contracts: The ISDA Master Agreement (Feb 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/7AAU-U69W. 
 41 See International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2014 ISDA Credit Deriva-
tives Definitions Art 4 (2014) (defining “Credit Events”). 
 42 Id § 4.2 (defining “Bankruptcy”); id § 4.5 (defining “Failure to Pay”). 
 43 See id § 4.7(a) (defining “Restructuring”). See also Daniel Hemel, Comment, 
Empty Creditors and Debt Exchanges, 27 Yale J Reg 159, 161–63 (2010) (distinguishing 
binding from voluntary restructurings). 
 44 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to promulgate rules establishing central clearing, but that has not happened. See 
15 USC § 8302. 
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banks are party to 99 percent of swaps worldwide.45 If an investor 
wants to buy protection on a particular company, it goes to, say, 
Bank of America, who will accommodate the trade and seek to 
offset its exposure either by selling the reference entity’s debt or 
by buying CDS protection from someone else who wants to take 
the opposite side.46 If the investor later wants to close out the posi-
tion, the dealer will, for a fee, unwind the swap at its then-current 
value and look to remove its own hedge.47 
Standardization and mediation together imply a market. 
Some participants come to hedge, some to speculate, and some to 
arbitrage.48 The key point for present purposes is that the CDS 
market allows investors, in combination with the reference en-
tity’s debt instruments or not, to establish a wide variety of eco-
nomic interests in the reference entity’s financial performance.49 
B. CDS and Creditor Payoffs 
Creditors with CDS protection face the prospect of default 
differently than do otherwise identically situated creditors with-
out protection. The precise contours of this difference vary from 
case to case. The principal factor, and the one we wish to make 
clear, is the ratio of debt to CDS an investor holds.50 On this di-
mension, we can for simplicity divide hedged creditors into three 
types: net-long, empty, and net-short. There are two distinctive 
 
 45 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Registration Process for Security-
Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 80 Fed Reg 48964, 
48998 n 293 (2015), amending 17 CFR §§ 240, 249. 
 46 Dealers also trade with one another to absorb and lay off risk. Approximately two-
thirds of all CDS trading volume is between dealers for this purpose. See id at 49001. 
 47 An investor can also get out of its position by novation or by entering a new swap 
with opposite terms. But these options are generally more cumbersome, because dealers 
specialize in information about willing traders. 
 48 The arbitrage possibility arises from the strong correlation between a CDS and 
the bonds and notes of the entity it references. Buying a bond and selling CDS protection 
roughly offset each other, as do selling a bond and buying CDS protection. The correlations 
are imperfect, however. Spreads diverge on account of counterparty and other risks of 
CDS, see Jennie Bai and Pierre Collin-Dufresne, The CDS-Bond Basis, 48 Fin Mgmt 417, 
419 (2019), and because of the value of control rights provided by debt instruments but 
not by CDS, see Peter Feldhütter, Edith Hotchkiss, and Oğuzhan Karakaş, The Value of 
Creditor Control in Corporate Bonds, 121 J Fin Econ 1, 4 (2016). 
 49 For additional detail on the functioning of the CDS market, see Gina-Gail S. 
Fletcher, Engineered Credit Default Swaps: Innovative or Manipulative?, 94 NYU L Rev 
1073, 1081–93 (2019). 
 50 Other determinants include: mismatched maturity profiles between debt and 
CDS, see Lubben, 81 Am Bankr L J at 427–28 (cited in note 4); mismatched seniority (that 
is, where the debt is senior to the obligations delivered to auction); and lumpy payment 
schedules (that is, upfront-coupon mismatch). 
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ways that owning CDS can cause a creditor to want to undermine 
its debtor’s value: (1) net-long and empty creditors, although gen-
erally sympathetic to traditional investors, may reject certain 
value-maximizing restructurings that fail to trigger CDS; and 
(2) net-short creditors outright prefer value destruction and default. 
In general, net-long creditors—those who hold more of a com-
pany’s debt than CDS protection on it—prefer that the debtor suc-
ceed. To illustrate, recall the net-long investor A, who owns a 
$1,000 bond issued by C and $500 notional of CDS written on C. 
Suppose the bond matures tomorrow, so that C will either pay 
principal or file for bankruptcy. If C files for bankruptcy, the bond 
will be worth $400. In this scenario, A is strictly better off if C 
performs. If C pays the bond, A gets $1,000; but if C files for bank-
ruptcy, triggering the CDS, then A gets a cash CDS payment of 
$300 [because ($500)*(1.00−0.40)=$300] and a bankruptcy claim 
worth $400, for a total of $700. All else equal, net-long creditors 
prefer their debt instruments to be worth more, and so in general 
their interests align with those of traditional creditors. 
All else is not always equal, however. In one narrow class of 
situations, namely when a distressed company seeks to renegoti-
ate its debts, the interests of net-long and unhedged creditors can 
diverge. In order to trigger CDS, net-long creditors may turn 
down debt exchanges they believe to be value preserving. Under 
the ISDA definitions applicable in North America, a voluntary re-
structuring doesn’t qualify as a credit event.51 Net-long creditors 
thus may hold out for a value-destroying bankruptcy—at least if 
they can’t cheaply unwind their swap.52 They have an incentive to 
do so in particular when the securities offered in a debt exchange 
are worth less than the sum of what the creditor can expect to 
recover in bankruptcy and through its CDS.53 
 
 51 See 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions § 4.7(b) (cited in note 41) (defining 
“Restructuring”). See also Hemel, Comment, 27 Yale J Reg at 161–63 (cited in note 43) 
(discussing strategic implications). 
 52 See Hemel, Comment, 27 Yale J Reg at 160, 164 (cited in note 43). 
 53 Net-long and unhedged creditors are apt to disagree about the desirability of a 
debt exchange in another way, too. When information is asymmetric, hedged creditors are 
less willing to bow to a debtor’s representations of doom when it seeks to restructure. 
Hedged creditors can afford more skepticism because they “stand to lose less in default” 
than unhedged creditors do. Patrick Bolton and Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps 
and the Empty Creditor Problem, 24 Rev Fin Stud 2617, 2618 (2011). Under certain as-
sumptions, the very reluctance of net-long creditors to compromise their claims can disci-
pline managers and so increase a company’s borrowing capacity ex ante. See id at 2619. 
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Empty creditors—those whose debt is perfectly hedged—have 
broadly similar interests. They are less keen on the debtor’s success 
than net-long creditors are, but they are generally happy to see the 
debtor thrive. Roughly speaking, an empty creditor is equally 
pleased if its bond performs or if it loses value and a credit event 
occurs. What the empty creditor really does not want is for the value 
of its debt to decline without a credit event being triggered. 
The net-short creditor stands apart. Only the net-short cred-
itor relishes bad news. Hedged and empty creditors may want to 
trigger a credit event if the value of their debt is impaired, and 
they may tolerate some loss of value to achieve a credit event; but 
only the net-short creditor profits as a general matter when its 
debtor loses value. 
To see why, consider the net-short creditor A, who has a 
$1,000 bond issued by C and $2,000 notional of CDS written on 
C. And suppose there are just four possible states of the world: 
the bond can be worth either $1,000 or $400, and in either case C 
can either experience a credit event or not. Below is a summary 
of the net-short creditor’s payoffs (treating the cost of the CDS as 
sunk). Crucially, A can benefit from, and can’t be hurt by, a credit 
event. 
TABLE 1: NET-SHORT CREDITOR’S PAYOFF WITH CDS 








$400 + $1,200 
[($2,000)*(1.00−0.40)=$1,200] 
$400 
C. Net-Short Sabotage Tactics 
A net-short saboteur is thus a net-short creditor who actively 
uses its rights as creditor to bring about the debtor’s ruin.54 The 
prospect of sabotage was evident to thoughtful observers almost 
as soon as CDS became widely traded and has been a staple of 
complaints about distressed-debt markets ever since.55 
 
 54 Others have dubbed this kind of creditor a “Darth Vader” or a “Trojan Horse” cred-
itor. See Partnoy and Skeel, 75 U Cin L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 4) (using Darth Vader); 
Janger and Levitin, 104 Iowa L Rev at 1865 (cited in note 13) (using Trojan Horse). 
 55 See, for example, Baird and Rasmussen, 119 Yale L J at 651 (cited in note 4); Hu 
and Black, 156 U Pa L Rev at 731, 734 (cited in note 3); Tung, 57 UCLA L Rev at 167–69 
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But how exactly can a saboteur achieve its aims? Creditors’ 
direct governance rights are limited. A net-short shareholder 
might wage a proxy campaign to install like-minded saboteurs on 
the board, or threaten to do so, and cajole directors of good faith 
but weak stomachs.56 Bondholders, by contrast, don’t customarily 
have voting rights or board representation. 
Creditor influence is instead a function of the debtor’s liquidity. 
Nominally, to be sure, indentures and loan agreements assign 
creditors power to veto specified corporate acts. Covenants forbid 
debtors from one or another course of action and leave it to the dis-
cretion of bondholders or lenders, as the case may be, to waive their 
strictures. But the consequence of a debtor’s breach of covenant is 
to allow the creditors to pull out capital by accelerating repay-
ment obligations.57 If the debtor has the cash needed to repay the 
principal, the creditors have no complaint. Put differently, credi-
tors’ governance rights, however broadly worded, are in the end 
limited by the debtor’s capacity to refinance. 
The means of creditor sabotage must then involve provoking, 
or at least exacerbating, a liquidity crisis at the targeted com-
pany. Two tactics are discussed in the literature. As we shall see, 
both require the activist to assemble a relatively large position in 
at least one tranche of the target’s bonds or notes.58 This fact, in 
turn, implies that sabotage entails a large capital outlay because 
 
(cited in note 4); Partnoy and Skeel, 75 U Cin L Rev at 1034–35 (cited in note 4); Lubben, 
81 Am Bankr L J at 427–28 (cited in note 4). See also Stephen J. Lubben and Rajesh P. 
Narayanan, CDS and the Resolution of Financial Distress, 24 J Applied Corp Fin 129, 131 
(Fall 2012) (noting that “the holder of a large, speculative CDS position could acquire a 
position in a distressed firm’s traded debt with the intent of blocking a potential workout”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 56 A net-short shareholder would also presumably vote against corporate interests 
with respect to transactions requiring a shareholder vote. For a case where a fully hedged 
shareholder arguably tried (unsuccessfully) to push through a value-destroying merger, 
see Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings, Pursuant to Sec-
tion 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 203(e) of the Investment Ad-
visers Act of 1940, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a Cease-and-
Desist Order, In re Perry Corp, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No 60351, SEC 
Administrative Proceeding No 3-13561 *2 (July 21, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 2009 
WL 2163550). 
 57 See Kahan and Rock, 103 Nw U L Rev at 283–84 (cited in note 18) (sketching the 
significance of the fact that acceleration is effectively the sole remedy for a covenant vio-
lation). Lenders with a security interest in the debtor’s property also enjoy a foreclosure 
remedy, of course. 
 58 Loans are harder to use because many credit agreements give the borrower power 
to prevent a fund it mistrusts from becoming a lender. See Michael Bellucci and Jerome 
McCluskey, The LSTA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide 554–58 (McGraw-Hill 2d ed 
2017) (describing disqualified lender provisions). 
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the saboteur profits only to the extent its short position in CDS is 
larger (in notional terms) than its long position in the target’s debt. 
The first tactic we have already briefly mentioned: holding 
out to frustrate a debtor’s commercially reasonable attempt to re-
structure its balance sheet. The idea is to force a payment default 
and liquidation, or at least a disorderly bankruptcy filing. To il-
lustrate the logic, consider a company, Acme Inc, with a simple 
capital structure. Acme’s only obligation is to pay $1,000 of bonds 
due next year. If the company continues as a going concern, in-
vestors expect it to generate future cash flows with a present 
value of $800. If instead Acme is liquidated, investors expect its 
assets to fetch just $400. Traditional creditors should be willing 
to restructure their claims to forestall liquidation. Traditional 
creditors want one another to agree to restructure because they 
would rather recover eighty cents on the dollar than forty.59 
A net-short activist creditor, by contrast, wants Acme’s bonds 
to diminish in value. It wants liquidation and so wants any 
workout to fail.60 The activist can help make this happen if it ac-
quires a substantial amount of Acme’s bonds (which should trade 
between forty and eighty cents) and simply refuses to tender them 
in any exchange offer no matter how generous the terms. If the 
saboteur acquires too little of Acme’s debt, holding out will not 
prevent the workout’s success; other bondholders’ decisions to ex-
change will give the company the liquidity it needs to continue as 
a going concern. But if the saboteur’s position is big enough, it can 
scuttle exchange offers predicated on a minimum-participation 
threshold and discourage other bondholders from accepting di-
minished claims. 
The potency of “workout frustration,” as we might call it, is 
clear, even if it has purchase only when a debtor is already at the 
point of a pending liquidity crunch. Its prevalence, however, is 
another question. The tactics are observationally identical to 
what one would expect from an empty or even net-long (but 
 
 59 See also Buccola, 114 Nw U L Rev at 711–13 (cited in note 27) (discussing collective-
action problem). 
 60 See also Tung, 57 UCLA L Rev at 168 (cited in note 4): 
[A] lender with a $100 million exposure on a loan may have purchased protection 
for a notional amount of $200 million. In that case, the lender holds a net nega-
tive position in the debt, which means it would profit from the borrower’s default. 
That creditor would be worse than indifferent to a workout; it would gain the 
most by affirmatively sabotaging any workout effort and causing the borrower 
to fail. 
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hedged) creditor.61 Thus, rumors have circulated since the early 
days of CDS about creditors blocking commercially reasonable 
workouts in favor of default. Instances such as AbitibiBowater,62 
Six Flags,63 and LyondellBasell64 are just a few examples. But it 
is not always clear whether the holdouts are supposed simply to 
have agitated for a credit event or else, more troublingly, to have 
sought to undermine valuable operations. 
The other way to sabotage a distressed debtor involves litiga-
tion. The activist locates a covenant violation that cannot be eas-
ily cured and surprises the debtor with a suit to accelerate repay-
ment obligations,65 despite knowing (or rather because it knows) 
full well that the debtor will be unable to make good on those ob-
ligations.66 The idea, as with workout frustration, is to create a 
scenario where the targeted company’s illiquidity prevents it from 
realizing its highest value as a going concern. To return to the 
Acme example above, sabotage-by-litigation works in effect by ac-
celerating the company’s $1,000 repayment obligation from the 
next period to this one. 
Sabotage-by-litigation appears to give an activist bang for its 
buck. Acceleration doesn’t just force a targeted company to (in ef-
fect) buy back the activist’s series of bonds or notes at par.67 For 
debtors of any substantial size and complexity, an adverse judg-
ment threatens to create a cascade of repayment obligations. The 
 
 61 See note 52 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Lubben and Narayanan, 24 J Applied Corp Fin at 132 (cited in note 55); 
George Soros, The Three Steps to Financial Reform (Financial Times, June 16, 2009), 
online at https://www.ft.com/content/b62b1bd4-5aa3-11de-8c14-00144feabdc0 (visited 
July 18, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 63 See Hemel, Comment, 27 Yale J Reg at 159–60 (cited in note 43) (recounting rumor 
while acknowledging its speculative quality); CDSs and Bankruptcy: No Empty Threat 
(The Economist, June 18, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/UNG5-MLN7. 
 64 See In Re Lyondell Chemical Co, 402 Bankr 571, 585 n 26 (Bankr SDNY 2009) 
(noting rumor that some creditors of the debtors’ European parent were seeking to accel-
erate repayment obligations on their notes in order to trigger CDS payouts); John A.E. 
Pottow, Bankruptcy Fiduciary Duties in the World of Claims Trading, 13 Brooklyn J Corp, 
Fin & Comm L 87, 94 n 44 (2018) (asserting that CDS “made some creditors impervious, 
even gleeful, regarding the prospect of nonpayment”). 
 65 See Ad Hoc Committee for Revision of the 1983 Model Simplified Indenture, Re-
vised Model Simplified Indenture, 55 Bus L 1115, 1136 (2000) (containing a draft model 
provision, § 6.02). 
 66 This is Aurelius’s supposed tactic in Windstream. See note 144 and accompanying text. 
 67 Ad Hoc Committee, 55 Bus L at 1136 (cited in note 65) (containing a draft model 
provision, § 6.08). 
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acceleration of an obligation to repay one class of security fre-
quently itself constitutes a default on others,68 so most if not all of 
a company’s debt might come due at once and suddenly. For lev-
eraged firms, that spells bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that sabotage-by-litigation 
requires the activist to assemble a large position in the target’s 
debt. Standard indentures allow either the trustee or the holders 
of 25 percent of the outstanding amount of the relevant bonds or 
notes to assert a covenant violation.69 But indenture trustees are 
famously passive, and would-be saboteurs, given their aims and 
the imperative of secrecy, may struggle to line up confederates. 
They must therefore regard 25 percent as a minimum. But inden-
tures also allow the holders of more than 50 percent of the bonds 
issued under them to waive asserted defaults.70 Because by hy-
pothesis saboteurs are trying to diminish the value of the securi-
ties, they must expect a waiver vote to be forthcoming. So, in prac-
tice, a net-short activist may need to acquire an outright majority 
of at least one tranche of the targeted company’s debt. 
II.  SOURCES OF LIQUIDITY AND COASEAN SKEPTICISM 
Despite the fact that scholars and market participants worry 
earnestly about creditor sabotage, there is good reason to doubt 
its factual basis. In brief, the story’s logic overlooks the interests 
and reactive capacities of actors other than the would-be sabo-
teur.71 Only a foolish investor would aim at sabotage—which, af-
ter all, is costly to undertake—if it anticipated that others would 
scotch its plans. The story’s plausibility thus turns on whether 
 
 68 Such “cross-default” provisions are a staple of credit agreements, see Bellucci and 
McCluskey, The LSTA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide at 446–49 (cited in note 58), as 
well as indentures, see, for example, Ad Hoc Committee, 55 Bus L at 1187–88 (cited in 
note 65) (containing a draft model provision, § 6.01). 
 69 See, for example, Ad Hoc Committee, 55 Bus L at 1136 (cited in note 65) (contain-
ing a draft model provision, § 6.02). See also Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: 
The Trade-Off Between Individual and Collective Rights, 77 NYU L Rev 1040, 1049 (2002) 
(“A breach of the indenture other than a payment default generally becomes an ‘Event of 
Default’ only if either the trustee or holders of 25% of the bonds give a ‘Notice of Default’ 
to the company and the company fails to cure the default within a specified time period.”). 
 70 See, for example, Ad Hoc Committee, 55 Bus L at 1136 (cited in note 65) (contain-
ing a draft model provision, § 6.01, and defining “Event of Default” as a default not waived 
and continuing sixty days after notice). 
 71 See Yadav, 67 Vand L Rev at 776 (cited in note 22) (“In the established account, 
scholars focus on the incentives of a company’s lenders of record. . . . Remarkably, schol-
arship entirely overlooks the role played by those who sell credit protection to lenders and 
assume the risk of a loan.”). 
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targets of sabotage should be expected to procure the liquidity 
they need to preserve economic value after a net-short activist re-
veals itself. We argue that one should expect exactly that, because 
targets will invariably have allies with reasons and, often, with 
means to thwart and punish the saboteur. 
a) Reasons.  Straightforward Coasean analysis shows why at-
tempts at net-short sabotage imply the existence of parties willing, 
if not able, to pay to undermine the saboteur.72 Indeed, other par-
ties will inevitably have more to gain from stopping the activist 
than it will have to lose from being stopped. As we have seen, the 
idea of net-short sabotage is to provoke a liquidity crisis that de-
stroys value and prompts a credit event. But swaps are zero-sum 
trades—whatever one side receives in settlement, the other side 
pays. The net effect of sabotage, then, taking into account inves-
tors in the targeted company as well as the swap counterparties, 
must be to reduce total economic value. It follows that economic 
value is maximized if sabotage can be forestalled. Those who will 
capture the surplus should be willing to supply liquidity to thwart 
the activist.73 
A variation on the Acme hypothetical described previously 
will illustrate the intuition. To recap, the company’s sole obliga-
tions are $1,000 face value of bonds outstanding and payable 
soon. But Acme can’t afford to pay the bonds and so seeks to re-
structure them. If the company can continue beyond the current 
period as a going concern, it will generate cash flows with a pre-
sent value of $800. If, on the other hand, it is liquidated now, its 
assets will fetch $400. Traditional bondholders should restruc-
ture their claims, pushing out maturities and perhaps reducing 
principal. They (as a group) are $400 better off if they do so. Now 
to complicate things, suppose that one of Acme’s bondholders, Ac-
tivist, is net short. Activist has, let us say, $1,000 of CDS protec-
tion and $200 of bonds, which it plans to use to try to scuttle a 
restructuring. 
A complete picture of the landscape takes into account the 
interests of three investors or groups of investors. First, there is 
Activist. As one would expect, Activist comes out ahead if Acme 
liquidates. In that case, its CDS pays out $600 [because 
 
 72 See generally Coase, 3 J L & Econ 1 (cited in note 21). 
 73 The classic Coasean trade would have the nonactivist parties pay the activist to 
back off. But often the better trade for them will be to supply liquidity to the targeted 
company so that the activist will lose on its CDS position. 
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($1,000)*(1.00−0.40)=$600], and its bonds recover $80 [because 
($200)*(0.4)=$80], for a total of $680.74 Activist’s payout if Acme 
continues as a going concern, on the other hand, is just the value 
of its share of the bonds, which is $160 [because 
($200)*(0.8)=$160]. Second, there are the bondholders other than 
Activist. Consistent with the traditional theory of corporate fi-
nance, they do better if Acme continues as a going concern. In that 
case, their bonds will recover $640 [because ($800)*(0.8)=$640]. 
If, on the other hand, Acme liquidates, their bonds will recover 
only $320 [because ($800)*(0.4)=$320]. Finally, there is Activist’s 
swap counterparty, Dealer. Dealer pays $600 if Acme defaults 
and nothing if it survives as a going concern. 
TABLE 2: PAYOFFS IF ACME DEFAULTS 
 Going Concern Liquidation Net 
Activist $160 $680 ($520) 
Bondholders $640 $320 $320 
Dealer $0 ($600) $600 
Total $800 $400 $400 
 
All together the parties are better off if Acme survives. More 
specifically, they are better off by $400—that is, the amount of 
economic surplus Acme’s survival preserves. More to the point, 
Dealer and Acme’s bondholders combined (other than Activist) 
are $920 better off if a restructuring succeeds. Together they 
should, in other words, be willing to spend almost $1,000 to en-
sure Acme’s continuity.75 
This analysis suggests a more general observation about the 
difficulty of profiting from sabotage. A net-short creditor’s returns 
from sabotage depend on the magnitude of the dislocation it 
causes. If the liquidity crisis it provokes leads to a big loss, such 
that the price of the target company’s debt tumbles, then the ac-
tivist’s CDS payout will also be big. If, on the other hand, the tar-
get’s illiquidity leads to a credit event but no change in the value 
of its debt—no real social loss—then the activist’s CDS payout 
will be modest. But because the return to other parties from 
providing responsive liquidity is a function of the economic value 
 
 74 The costs of CDS protection up until the current period are sunk, and, for the sake 
of simplicity, we ignore periodic coupons. 
 75 The model can be complicated to account for the interests of other Acme stake-
holders, such as employees. 
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that liquidity will preserve, their incentive to prevent sabotage is 
strongest in those cases where a net-short activist would other-
wise profit. In short, the chances of successful sabotage, given re-
sponsive incentives, are inversely related to the strategy’s pro-
spective profitability for the saboteur. 
b) Means.  Those who stand to benefit from thwarting sabo-
tage might not do so. The Coasean form of our reasoning suggests 
as much. There may be—and are—transaction costs that could 
prevent those opposed to the would-be saboteur from striking a 
mutually advantageous deal in any given case. We conclude that 
activist investors looking forward ought almost invariably to ex-
pect that such a deal would be struck, and so ought to expect sab-
otage to fail, but the case needs to be made. 76 To that end, the rest 
of this Part describes the three principal sources of liquidity tar-
geted firms could be expected to tap—CDS protection sellers, the 
target’s own net-long investors, and bankruptcy—and weighs the 
significance of obstacles to their use. Our judgment is that no one 
source of liquidity is foolproof, but that betting against all three 
would be reckless. 
A. Liquidity from CDS Protection Seller(s) 
The most obvious source of liquidity for a company targeted 
by a net-short saboteur is a party or consortium of parties who 
 
 76 We do not reach the same conclusion with respect to some other kinds of CDS 
activism (recently much in the news), even though they also turn on a negative-sum trade 
that juices the return of one swap participant at the other’s expense. A CDS participant 
can try to influence the value of its position by intervening in the reference entity ’s affairs 
in one of two basic (and inversely related) ways. One way is sabotage. The other is a kind 
of persuasion. In a persuasive strategy, the swap participant offers cheap financing to the 
reference entity conditional on the company doing something, such as paying or defaulting 
on its bonds, that will affect the swap’s payout. Recent years have seen a variety of itera-
tions on the theme, including much-publicized “engineered defaults” and “orphaning” 
transactions. See, for example, Fletcher, 94 NYU L Rev at 1093–1103 (cited in note 49) 
(discussing leading cases). But both strategies have a singular theme: persuasion and sab-
otage involve (1) a zero-sum bet and (2) an economic dislocation. They are inversely re-
lated, however, because one works by reducing and the other by increasing the reference 
entity’s financing costs. That difference means that the economic dislocation is borne dif-
ferently, and it produces totally different political economies. In the case of sabotage, those 
who are harmed (other than swap counterparties) are, as we have emphasized, investors 
in the targeted company. They are a natural constituency and can be expected to coordi-
nate. In the case of persuasive activism, by contrast, those harmed (other than swap coun-
terparties) are scattered across the world. They are all the people whose financing costs 
are marginally higher due to the subsidy of the target. They do not even know who they 
are, and coordination is impossible. On any practical Coasean analysis, then, persuasive 
strategies pose a zero- rather than negative-sum prospect. 
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have sold CDS protection on the target. In principle, any financier 
will do. But investors exposed to the consequences of sabotage 
should be poised to offer liquidity cheaply. Their motivation to see 
the target avoid a credit event means that they should be willing 
to fund at a discount. Protection sellers should also be able to act 
relatively quickly, as they will already have analyzed the target’s 
financial condition. 
To illustrate the intuition, return to the Acme hypothetical. 
Acme has outstanding one series of bonds, and there is just one 
swap referencing its debt. The obvious financier is Dealer. Dealer 
must pay $600 if Acme suffers a credit event and $0 if it avoids 
one. Dealer is thus willing to incur a (nominal) loss of up to $600 
to prevent the default. That is, Dealer is willing to buy new stock 
or debt issued by Acme at up to a $600 discount, or even simply 
to gift up to $600 to preserve Acme. Because the principal amount 
of Activist’s bonds is just $200, Dealer can afford to finance a re-
demption or pay a judgment to make Activist go away. 
The real world is, of course, more complicated. It presents ob-
stacles to value-maximizing transactions that chalkboard hypo-
theticals by their nature obscure. What in particular might pre-
vent a CDS protection seller from blocking sabotage? Three 
obstacles merit discussion: swap market fragmentation, debt cov-
enants, and general bargaining problems. 
1. Swap market fragmentation. 
Where multiple firms have sold CDS protection on a sabotage 
target, coordination may prove difficult. The issue is a hold-out 
problem similar in character to the classic dilemma confronting 
creditors of a distressed firm.77 Each protection seller wants the 
target to receive the liquidity it needs to stay afloat but prefers 
 
 77 See Buccola, 114 Nw U L Rev at 730 (cited in note 27) (emphasis in original): 
It may be sensible for bondholders (viewed as a group) to restructure their 
claims. Even where this is so, however, each bondholder acting alone has an 
incentive not to agree to restructure her own claim. Even if she is better off com-
promising than holding out and watching a restructuring attempt fail, she is 
best off holding out while a sufficient number of fellow bondholders compromise. 
See also Kahan, 77 NYU L Rev at 1053–54 (cited in note 69); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy 
Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J L & Econ 595, 596 (1993); Robert Gertner and David 
Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J Fin 1189, 
1191 (1991); Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John, and Larry H.P. Lang, Troubled Debt Restruc-
turings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J Fin Econ 
315, 322–23 (1990); Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 Yale L J 
232, 237–39 (1987). 
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that others provide it. The cumulative effect if each balks can be 
to undercut the financing altogether and produce the worst-case 
scenario. 
Return to Acme, but suppose that, instead of buying $600 no-
tional of CDS protection from Dealer, Activist buys $100 of pro-
tection from each of six counterparties—Dealer1 through Dealer6. 
The cumulative interests are the same. Each of the six dealers 
should be willing to finance Acme’s liquidity at a (nominal) loss of 
up to $100. 
TABLE 3: PAYOFFS IF ACME DEFAULTS (WITH SIX CDS DEALERS) 
 Going Concern Liquidation Net 
Activist $160 $680 ($520) 
Bondholders $640 $320 $320 
Dealer1 $0 ($100) $100 
Dealer2 $0 ($100) $100 
Dealer3 $0 ($100) $100 
Dealer4 $0 ($100) $100 
Dealer5 $0 ($100) $100 
Dealer6 $0 ($100) $100 
Total $800 $400 $400 
 
If the Dealers had a mechanism by which they could first 
identify and then force one another to bear a pro rata share of the 
costs of thwarting Activist, their fragmentation would be trivial. 
Suppose, for example, that it is clear that the cheapest way to 
defeat Activist’s attempted sabotage is to call the outstanding 
bonds and refinance with new debt. This kind of transaction does 
not constitute a credit event,78 so the Dealers can avoid paying 
anything on their CDS. Under this plan, Acme will redeem the 
bonds for $1,000 (that is, par) and issue new bonds worth $800 in 
their place. It is in the Dealers’ collective interest to finance the 
recapitalization and bear the (nominal) $200 loss, because by do-
ing so they avoid having to pay $600 to settle their CDS with Ac-
tivist. If each Dealer agrees to bear its pro rata share of the refi-
nancing cost, each is $67 better off than if Activist were allowed 
to sabotage Acme. 
 
 78 See 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions § 4.7(b) (cited in note 41) (defining 
“Restructuring”). 
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But there is no mechanism to bind protection sellers. Dealer1 
would rather be up $67 than not, to be sure, but better yet, it could 
rely on Dealer2 through Dealer6 to cover refinancing costs and be 
up $100. If the Dealers’ positions were common knowledge, the 
imperative to maintain a reputation might mitigate hold-out in-
centives. But CDS positions are private, to say nothing of the va-
riety of non-CDS but potentially offsetting positions an investor 
might have. Net-long protection sellers with sufficiently small 
stakes are thus likely to have at least some incentive to demur 
from joining a financing consortium. Fragmentation threatens to 
make the perfect the enemy of the good. 
At the same time, there are reasons to think swap-market 
fragmentation is not an insuperable obstacle in most cases. The 
most obvious reason is empirical. In recent years, there have in 
fact been a number of cases where funds that have written CDS 
protection on a distressed company offer the company attractive 
financing. It is widely rumored, for example, that RadioShack, 
in an effort to postpone bankruptcy, got cheap financing from 
hedge funds who had sold CDS protection on it.79 More recently, 
protection sellers have provided liquidity at below-market price 
to SuperValu80 and McClatchy81 as part of so-called “orphaning” 
transactions. The protection sellers refinanced all of the reference 
entities’ outstanding debt, at a discount, so that a credit event 
would become logically impossible.82 Sears also appears to have 
gotten cheap financing, albeit in bankruptcy rather than to avoid 
it, from a fund that had sold CDS protection on the company.83 
There are also theoretical reasons, grounded in market dy-
namics, to think that fragmentation is unlikely to be decisive in 
most cases. Hold-out problems arise only where lots of parties 
each have small stakes. The bigger a position a party has, and the 
 
 79 See Fletcher, 94 NYU L Rev at 1098–1101 (cited in note 49). 
 80 See Meyer Dworkin, Jason Kyrwood, Michael Fan, and Michele Babkine, A Deep 
Dive into the CDS and Syndicated Financing Markets *4 (Law360, Mar 14, 2019), archived 
at https://perma.cc/4K23-FVXB. 
 81 See Fletcher, 94 NYU L Rev at 1101–03 (cited in note 49); Matt Levine, Credit 
Derivatives Bring People Together (Bloomberg, June 28, 2018), online at https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-28/credit-derivatives-bring-people-together 
(visited July 26, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 82 See Gavan Nolan, Orphaning Risk Drives Tightening on European Pair (IHS Mar-
kit, Sept 15, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Q3AS-AUZ7. See also Credit Derivatives: 
The Tender Age (The Economist, Apr 20, 2006), archived at https://perma.cc/KF45-V6HT 
(discussing cases where “holders of CDS contracts suddenly found themselves committed 
to paying for protection on bonds on the verge of extinction”). 
 83 See Dworkin, et al, CDS and Syndicated Financing Markets at *5 (cited in note 80). 
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more concentrated the holdings are perceived to be in general, the 
less likely it is to hold out. So if the net-long CDS protection 
sellers tend to have fairly large stakes, or believe they do, they 
should be willing to form consortia or even unilaterally to offer 
liquidity. 
In the case of sabotage, there is an arbitrage opportunity in 
assembling a blocking position. One or a small group of arbitra-
geurs can consolidate positions in order to overcome a potential 
hold-out scenario. Distressed-debt investors have been doing ex-
actly this in the loan and bond markets for a quarter century. A 
fund can agree to have others assign it their positions or can ac-
complish what comes to the same thing indirectly through a 
dealer (who would buy protection from the arbitrageur and un-
wind its equivalent positions). Consolidation can’t happen over-
night in most cases, we suspect. The CDS market is not liquid like 
the public-equity markets are. But net-short sabotage also does 
not occur overnight. There is time to respond after a would-be 
saboteur makes its play public. 
2. Debt covenants. 
A company targeted for sabotage is likely to have promised 
its creditors a variety of things. Some of the most attractive ways 
for CDS protection sellers to provide liquidity may require the 
company to countermand those promises. Two kinds of action are 
especially likely to raise issues: electing to prepay the would-be 
saboteur’s claim (to neuter its governance rights) and incurring 
incremental debt (to finance prepayment or otherwise). Common 
covenants might get in the way.84 These covenants seek to prevent 
debtors from subordinating or diluting existing creditors’ claims 
 
 84 Relevant covenants include: (1) maintenance of a range of financial conditions that 
paying bond debt or raising new debt might violate, see Bellucci and McCluskey, The 
LSTA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide at 312–27 (cited in note 58); (2) prohibition on 
incurring new debt, see id at 370–74 (discussing typical credit agreement provision); Wil-
liam J. Whelan III, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics, in William F. Maxwell and 
Mark R. Shenkman, eds, Leveraged Financial Markets: A Comprehensive Guide to High-
Yield Bonds, Loans, and Other Instruments 171, 185–88 (McGraw-Hill 2010) (discussing 
debt incurrence covenants commonly found in high-yield indentures); (3) prohibition on 
prepaying or otherwise modifying other debt, see Bellucci and McCluskey, The LSTA’s 
Complete Credit Agreement Guide at 396–98 (cited in note 58) (discussing typical credit 
agreement provision); Whelan, Bond Indentures and Bond Characteristics at 181–85 (cited 
in note 84) (discussing effect of “restricted payments” provisions found in high-yield in-
dentures); and (4) cross defaults, which cause a default on one debt instrument to ripple 
through the capital structure, see Bellucci and McCluskey, The LSTA’s Complete Credit 
Agreement Guide at 446–49 (cited in note 58). 
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or diverting assets that might be used to satisfy those claims. At 
least in principle, these covenants might limit the practical ability 
of protection sellers to supply liquidity on attractive terms. 
There are two basic responses to this concern. First, the cred-
itors to whom promises have been made have the ability, and will 
typically have an incentive, to permit protection sellers to ad-
vance new liquidity on commercially reasonable terms. By hy-
pothesis, the creditors are at risk of loss if a saboteur succeeds in 
destroying the debtor’s value. As we shall explain shortly, credi-
tors of a targeted company should themselves be willing to pro-
vide discounted financing to forestall a saboteur. They should 
therefore be all the more willing to allow others to do so. And hold-
out is unlikely to be a problem, because most debt instruments 
allow a simple majority of the relevant debt to bless acts (other 
than payment failure) that would otherwise count as a default.85 
Second, there are ways for CDS protection sellers to extend 
liquidity that are unlikely to run afoul of the target’s covenants. 
Buying newly issued equity is one example. Relevant covenants 
address transactions that (1) increase the amount of senior and 
equal-priority claims, (2) accelerate repayment of claims matur-
ing at the same time as or later than the relevant debt, or (3) di-
minish the asset base available to pay the debt. Equity issuance 
is typically allowed. So even if for some reason the target’s credi-
tors won’t allow commercially reasonable—indeed unreasonably 
cheap—new debt financing, the target could issue new equity. Ul-
timately, protection sellers should even be willing, if necessary, 
to make a cash infusion sufficient to cover whatever capital the 
saboteur seeks to withdraw. 
3. General bargaining problems. 
Striking a deal can be hard even when failure to do so would 
leave money on the table. Given infinite time, CDS protection 
sellers would come to an agreement among themselves and with 
the targeted company’s managers and creditors. But time is fi-
nite. The supposed techniques of net-short sabotage cannot be im-
plemented overnight, but they also do not necessarily take years 
to pull off. Given this reality, some value-maximizing deals will 
fail. There is not much to say about this. But we must remember 
 
 85 See Bellucci and McCluskey, The LSTA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide at 
510–12 (cited in note 58); Ad Hoc Committee, 55 Bus L at 1136, 1137 (cited in note 65) 
(containing draft model provisions, §§ 6.01, 6.04). 
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that the incentives for protection sellers to put a deal together 
increase with the stakes of sabotage. 
B. Liquidity from the Target’s (Other) Creditors 
The creditors of a targeted company other than the would-be 
saboteur are alternative sources of liquidity. Their reasons for 
wanting to prevent a crisis should by now be familiar. A saboteur 
hopes to be paid by whoever is on the other side of its CDS, not by 
fellow creditors. But fellow creditors are anticipated collateral 
damage. A saboteur profits by reducing the value of the target’s 
enterprise, which in turn reduces the value of its debt and in-
creases the settlement price for CDS. The Acme example in the 
previous Section illustrates the idea. If a net-short activist were 
to provoke a credit event without affecting the price of the target’s 
securities, fellow creditors would have no reason to intervene.86 A 
credit event with no effect on debt prices only shuffles funds be-
tween the derivative counterparties. But as we have discussed, 
the real money in sabotage comes from driving down the prices of 
reference debt securities. The important thing to see is that, this 
being so, a would-be saboteur’s fellow creditors should be willing 
to accept a (nominal) loss on their investments to avoid a bigger 
(real) loss. 
A target’s creditors have a variety of ways to provide liquidity, 
depending on the type of sabotage in issue. Most obviously, they 
can contribute new cash, and they can do so severally or through 
a consortium. In this respect, they are no different from CDS pro-
tection sellers. 
But creditors also have means for infusing liquidity that we 
can generically call forbearance. The liquidity crisis a saboteur 
seeks to provoke is a condition of having too little cash to pay cur-
rent obligations. Increasing cash or decreasing current obliga-
tions solves the problem equally well. The financial creditors of a 
sabotage target are uniquely positioned to help with the latter. 
They don’t control all of the demands on the target. They can’t 
relieve the company of the need to pay wages, rent, taxes, and so 
on. But they do have governance levers they can use to ameliorate 
liquidity crunches. 
 
 86 This explains why creditors haven’t objected in the manufactured-default cases. If 
anything, investors are happy about manufactured defaults because the reference entity 
gets new, below-market financing in exchange for its willingness to default. 
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Forbearance proper is an important means. As we have seen, 
one reported sabotage tactic is to litigate a covenant default with 
an eye to tripping cross defaults and so causing a cash crunch.87 
A judgment can dry up the targeted company’s access to working 
capital under its revolving credit facility88 and, more generally, 
give rise to the acceleration of most or all of its financial debt. But 
those consequences needn’t follow. The most extreme conse-
quences of an adverse judgment depend on the acquiescence (and 
sometimes action) of the very creditors whose claims the saboteur 
hopes a liquidity crisis will impair. Generally speaking, whether 
under a credit agreement or a bond indenture, a majority vote of 
the relevant creditors waives the consequences of an adverse 
judgment.89 Thus, without advancing any new cash, creditors can 
by agreement limit the liquidity effect of sabotage-by-litigation to 
the size of any adverse judgment. 
Creditors can also provide liquidity by restructuring their 
claims. A simple debt exchange, in which creditors swap instru-
ments maturing soon for instruments with a longer-dated ma-
turity, is the most straightforward way to do so. More complicated 
exchanges can undercut a saboteur more directly. If, for example, 
an activist pursues sabotage-by-litigation under an indenture 
that permits additional debt to be issued, creditors can swap into 
newly issued bonds and vote them against the saboteur. As we 
shall see, Windstream and its creditors tried but failed to properly 
execute this kind of exchange.90 
Two obstacles stand in the way of creditor-provided liquidity. 
First, fragmented ownership of debt can lead to a hold-out prob-
lem akin to the problem we discussed in relation to CDS protec-
tion sellers. Depending on the facts of a given case, creditors 
might need to offer liquidity at a discount to the then-prevailing 
market rate—that is, at a (nominal) loss. They might in principle 
argue without end about who should bear the cost, and so fail to 
strike a mutually advantageous deal. The more complicated a 
sabotage target’s capital structure is, and the more fragmented 
the holders within each tranche and across tranches are, the 
harder it may be to resolve disagreement. 
 
 87 See notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Bellucci and McCluskey, The LSTA’s Complete Credit Agreement Guide at 
463–65 (§§ 9.2.1, 9.2.2) (cited in note 58). 
 89 See id at 510–17 (cited in note 58); Ad Hoc Committee, 55 Bus L at 1136, 1137 
(cited in note 65) (containing draft model provisions, §§ 6.01, 6.04). 
 90 See text accompanying notes 123–33. 
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Second, not all creditors have the institutional capacity to re-
spond actively even if doing so in a particular case would maxim-
ize the value of their holdings. Collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs), for example, which now hold half of all outstanding lev-
eraged loans to US borrowers,91 may be diversified to such an ex-
tent that managers have weak incentives to intervene. Some 
bondholders likewise—and even more so—are designed to be pas-
sive. The managers of bond mutual and exchange-traded funds 
(ETFs), in particular, may lack flexibility to invest new money 
opportunistically. Consistent with the imperative to diversity, 
they, like some CLO managers, have only dull incentives to en-
gage in the kind of diligence and negotiation that might be needed 
to optimize individual investments in the portfolio. Collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs) can, depending on details, face similar 
hurdles, although CDOs today tend to be designed to allow oppor-
tunistic trading strategies.92 In general, as the fraction of a sabo-
tage target’s debt held by de facto passive investors grows, the 
deterrent effect of possible responsive intervention could weaken. 
The significance of these impediments to cooperation should 
not, however, be overstated. Fragmentation and passivity are, af-
ter all, generic features of the debt markets. They pose potential 
barriers to efficient renegotiation in general, not only in cases of 
threatened sabotage. Yet debt investors commonly reach coopera-
tive solutions. One should expect them to do so all the more readily 
were they to face an acknowledged common enemy and a poten-
tially large surplus. 
Trading is the key. Credit pools that lack capacity to inter-
vene effectively can sell their stakes. (Mutual funds and ETFs 
tracking an index cannot, but they are exceptional in this regard.) 
The conventional buyers of distressed debt are precisely those pri-
vate equity and hedge funds who specialize in adding value 
through activism. Their function is at once to concentrate owner-
ship and convert the owner base from passive to active. 
The mechanism is fallible. Not every deal that could be made 
is made in fact. We would not expect a sabotage target’s creditors 
 
 91 Emily Liu and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, FEDS Notes: Who Owns U.S. CLO Securi-
ties? (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 19, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/2KZ9-V28Q. 
 92 See Matt Wirz and Cezary Podkul, Hedge Funds Revive the Junk Bond CDO (Wall 
St J, Nov 7, 2018), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-funds-revive-the-junk 
-bond-cdo-1541592000 (visited Apr 4, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing the 
new breed of corporate-debt CDOs as vehicles for credit hedge funds to leverage capital). 
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to be unfailingly reliable sources of liquidity. But our argument 
demands far less than ideal conditions. It is important only to es-
tablish that a potential saboteur ex ante has reason to think its 
fellow creditors would undermine the plot by providing liquidity 
on their own. 
C. Liquidity from Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy can offer liquidity to a sabotage target if the ob-
stacles to an out-of-court solution involving CDS protection 
sellers and the target’s investors prove insurmountable.93 If the 
target uses Chapter 11 judiciously and with the support of its in-
vestors, it can avoid the disruption to and uncertainty about its 
operations that a saboteur hopes to provoke. To be sure, bank-
ruptcy ought usually to be a last resort. The filing of a Chapter 11 
petition is a credit event for CDS purposes,94 which means that 
protection sellers will not emerge unscathed. Bankruptcy can be 
expensive, both in reputational and out-of-pocket terms.95 A sur-
gical and short proceeding is therefore imperative. But if the tar-
get has sufficient backing for a plan to neuter the saboteur, bank-
ruptcy can also overcome hold-out obstacles in short order and so 
preserve expectations of value, the loss of which would enhance 
the saboteur’s recovery.96 And because an activist investor weigh-
ing up its options cannot assume its putative target will fail to 
plan properly, bankruptcy stands as a reason not to try sabotage. 
Chapter 11 gives debtors access to liquidity in several ways. 
Most obviously, the filing of a petition stays creditors’ collection 
efforts.97 The stay allows a debtor to keep valuable combinations 
of assets together for a time, provided it has access to enough cash 
to cover ongoing expenses. More importantly for our purposes, 
 
 93 More precisely, bankruptcy establishes conditions that make it relatively easy for 
the debtor to procure liquidity it could not otherwise arrange. 
 94 2014 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions § 4.2 (cited in note 41) (defining 
“Bankruptcy”). 
 95 There have been many attempts to quantify the costs of bankruptcy. For a now 
somewhat dated survey, see Ben Branch, The Costs of Bankruptcy: A Review, 11 Intl Rev 
Fin Analysis 39, 40–42 (2002). None of these attempts, however, isolate the costs of bank-
ruptcy in cases with the features one would expect to find in sabotage-inspired filings. 
 96 Generally speaking, bankruptcy overcomes the kinds of hold-out dynamics de-
scribed above by providing a binding mechanism to value creditors’ claims. See Buccola, 
114 Nw U L Rev at 722–27 (cited in note 27). Bankruptcy’s capacity to do so has long been 
recognized as one of its principal justifications. See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, 
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L J 857, 
861–64 (1982). 
 97 11 USC § 362(a). 
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though, bankruptcy can enhance liquidity because it encourages 
deals to restructure debts (relieving immediate cash needs) and 
to raise incremental borrowing through debtor-in-possession fi-
nancing (satisfying immediate cash needs).98 
A confirmed plan of reorganization creates restructuring li-
quidity. If liquidity is the debtor’s only need, as by hypothesis it 
is in a sabotage case, the simplest plan simply forces creditors to 
exchange claims with short-dated maturities for new, longer-
dated claims. Such a plan can be speedily confirmed if each class 
of creditor to be impaired votes to approve it.99 Depending on the 
facts, a plan may be able to classify claims so that the saboteur 
has less than a blocking position. If so, the saboteur’s claim can 
be restructured along with those of similarly situated creditors.100 
If not, a plan can pay the saboteur’s claim in full, restructuring 
other claims to pay for it, and so render its opposition to the plan 
immaterial.101 
The important point either way is to file for bankruptcy with 
the full-throated support of most or all creditors other than the 
saboteur itself. That way a case can move quickly at minimum 
cost. One recent prepackaged plan was confirmed less than 
twenty-four hours after the petition was filed.102 Most cases take 
longer, of course, but the proof of concept is meaningful. A bank-
ruptcy judge who believes sabotage prompted the case before her 
is apt to act with dispatch. A plan could easily be confirmed before 
ISDA even holds the associated CDS settlement auction. 
Incremental borrowing liquidity is available without the ba-
roque procedures of plan confirmation. As we have seen, covenants 
in a targeted company’s existing debt contracts might preclude 
 
 98 See generally Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel Jr, Bankruptcy Law as a Li-
quidity Provider, 80 U Chi L Rev 1557 (2013) (analyzing the mechanisms by which bank-
ruptcy provides liquidity). 
 99 11 USC § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i). Approval requires creditors holding two-thirds of a 
class’s claims by value and more than half by number to vote in favor. 11 USC § 1126(c). 
 100 At minimum, a restructuring support agreement documenting the support of most 
or all creditors other than the saboteur can speed the confirmation process. See Douglas 
G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 Am Bankr L J 593, 603–04 (2017). 
 101 See 11 USC § 1129(a)(8)(B). Alternatively, the target could seek to have the sabo-
teur’s vote designated under 11 USC § 1126(e) or a plan crammed down over its veto per 
11 USC § 1129(b), but these maneuvers require time-consuming litigation. 
 102 Katherine Doherty, Sungard Availability Sets Record for Fastest Chapter 11 Ap-
proval (Bloomberg, May 2, 2019), online at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2019-05-02/sungard-availability-sets-record-for-fastest-chapter-11-approval (visited July 
26, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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additional borrowing needed to preserve value. Coordination dif-
ficulties might prevent the beneficiaries of those covenants from 
waiving them. Chapter 11 answers this contingency. It dispenses 
with contractual restrictions on new debt and permits debtors to 
borrow additional funds, on a priority basis, at the judge’s say-
so.103 An order granting debtor-in-possession financing on an in-
terim basis is customarily entered on the first day of proceedings, 
and a final order follows as soon thereafter as a briefing schedule 
permits. To the extent a saboteur’s tactics threaten liquidity in 
the very near term—that is, before a plan of reorganization can 
be confirmed—debtor-in-possession financing offers relief. 
There are downsides to a sabotage target’s use of bankruptcy 
for liquidity. Two in particular are worth bearing in mind. First, 
a bankruptcy filing reduces the marginal incentive of CDS protec-
tion sellers to provide financing. The fact of a Chapter 11 case 
means that CDS will pay out. Depending on how far below par 
the target’s bonds are trading at the time, that can be a substan-
tial sum; and the protection sellers don’t get their money back if 
the target’s fortunes improve. Second, bankruptcy is typically 
more expensive than an out-of-court workout. The difference in a 
sabotage case, where the mass of creditors are (by hypothesis) 
aligned with the debtor, is hard to estimate. It is probably rela-
tively small. But it is a difference, and the difference should be 
expected to reduce debt prices at least marginally, juicing the sab-
oteur’s CDS payoff. 
Nevertheless, bankruptcy provides a liquidity backstop. And, 
because workout negotiations occur in Chapter 11’s shadow, the 
very existence of a bankruptcy option should make it easier to 
overcome hold-out problems without the need for compulsory pro-
cess.104 In a given case, CDS protection sellers or the target’s in-
vestors might not provide valuable liquidity without bankruptcy, 
or even with it. But in light of their interests and capacities, it 
seems to us that to bet against some kind of deal—a bet that sab-
otage entails—would be foolish in nearly every case. And the more 
one might hope to profit from sabotage, the more foolish the bet 
that one can pull it off seems to be. 
 
 103 11 USC § 364. 
 104 See Schwartz, 36 J L & Econ at 602–03 (cited in note 77). 
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III.  WINDSTREAM: A CASE STUDY 
We have said why we think sabotage is hard in general to 
pull off and suggested that activist investors, seeing this, are un-
likely to try it. Our reasons are speculative, however. They de-
pend on a particular model of debt markets. It is not a demanding 
model. It requires only that investors be reasonably good at coor-
dinating when the alternative is millions of dollars of losses on 
top of humiliation at the hands of a rival. But facts can prove the 
model wrong. If it turns out that activist funds do in fact execute 
net-short sabotage tactics, and do in fact profit from them, then 
our model is wrong. 
As an attempt at falsification, we seek to reconstruct Aure-
lius’s intervention in Windstream. The consensus that Aurelius 
performed sabotage makes it a useful case study. If upon exami-
nation there is good reason to think this consensus is right, then 
reality will have marked at least a limit to our general theory. 
But if, on the other hand, examination of the case suggests that 
Aurelius aimed at something different from sabotage, then our 
theory will at least have survived a meaningful attempt at falsi-
fication and we will have learned something about gullibility. 
To preview, we find that Aurelius likely sought to impose 
what we consider a “breach tax” on Windstream for violating its 
sale-leaseback covenant. Publicly available facts do not allow us 
to rule out sabotage, but they point toward an alternative account 
of the case. 
A. The Facts 
1. The spin-off. 
The story starts in 2013, when Windstream Services, a tele-
communications provider with operations in eighteen states, be-
gan to consider spinning off some of its real estate assets into a 
separate, publicly traded company.105 The reason to do so was not 
to restructure operations. Windstream’s management were clear 
that the fiber optic cables and copper wires to be spun off were 
“essential and the only means for [the company] to serve cli-
ents.”106 The reason, as in so many real estate spin-offs, was tax 
 
 105 US Bank National Association v Windstream Services, LLC , 2019 WL 948120 
*2 (SDNY). 
 106 Id at *5. 
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minimization.107 A plan was thus hatched to separate the com-
pany’s assets formally but functionally to keep them together. 
Windstream and its subsidiaries would transfer real estate assets 
to an investment trust—to become known as Uniti Group, Inc—
but would at the same time enter a long-term lease with the trust 
ensuring continued use rights.108 
There was just one problem. Windstream had covenanted in 
its debt contracts that it wouldn’t do the kind of transaction most 
natural in the circumstances, namely a sale-leaseback.109 Rather 
than seek a waiver from its noteholders, however, Windstream 
sought to structure a transaction that would replicate the eco-
nomics of a sale-leaseback without running afoul of the technical 
terms of its covenants. Its credit agreement and note indentures 
arguably prohibited only bilateral deals, arrangements in which 
a single entity sells and leases back an asset.110 So Windstream 
structured a triangular deal involving a newly incorporated hold-
ing company, Windstream Holdings, Inc. Roughly speaking, the 
arrangement was to work as follows: (1) Windstream Services 
 
 107 Then-prevailing tax rules allowed a company to avoid double taxation on real es-
tate assets if it did a spin-off correctly. See, for example, Austan Goolsbee and Edward 
Maydew, Taxes and Organizational Form: The Case of REIT Spin-Offs, 55 Natl Tax J 441, 
445–46 (2002). Legislation taking effect in December 2015 largely closed off the tax bene-
fit. Even so, there can be administrative and financial reasons to separate assets even 
where operations will remain entwined. See generally Emilie R. Feldman, Corporate 
Spinoffs and Analysts’ Coverage Decisions: The Implications for Diversified Firms, 37 Stra-
tegic Mgmt J 1196 (2016) (finding that companies that divest legacy businesses enjoy 
greater improvements in forecast accuracy and stock market performance); Emilie R. Feld-
man, Legacy Divestitures: Motives and Implications, 25 Org Sci 815 (2014) (discussing var-
ious reasons why corporations divest their legacy businesses). Windstream’s CEO would 
later cite some generic rationales for the transaction in this vein. See Thomas Declaration 
¶ 26 at *14–15 (cited in note 7). But tax benefits must have been an important motivation. 
 108 See generally Windstream Holdings, Inc, Master Lease (Apr 24, 2015), archived 
at https://perma.cc/77DP-KXHM. 
 109 See Windstream Corporation 6 3/8 % Senior Notes Due 2023 Indenture Dated as of 
January 23, 2013 § 4.19, *71 (Jan 23, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/2KQU-5J7G 
(“2013 Indenture”) (“The Company shall not, and shall not permit any of its Restricted Sub-
sidiaries to, enter into any Sale and Leaseback Transaction.”). Sale-leaseback covenants are 
common. A sale-leaseback reduces the debtor’s asset base and can be used, in effect, to 
borrow additional amounts and so dilute existing creditors’ claims. 
 110 See id § 1.01 at *24: 
“Sale and Leaseback Transaction” means with respect to any Person, any 
transaction involving any of the assets or properties of such Person whether now 
owned or hereafter acquired, whereby such Person sells or otherwise transfers 
such assets or properties and then or thereafter leases such assets or properties 
or any part thereof or any other assets or properties which such Person intends 
to use for substantially the same purpose or purposes as the assets or properties 
sold or transferred. 
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transfers assets to Uniti; (2) Uniti leases the assets to Wind-
stream Holdings; and (3) Windstream Services pays Windstream 
Holdings to use the assets under its lease.111 Windstream Services 
would transfer assets and then pay a periodic sum to continue us-
ing them, but at least arguably not on account of a “Sale and Lease-
back Transaction” as defined in the company’s debt documents. 
The spin-off closed in 2015, and for two years no one objected.112 
2. The litigation. 
Then, in 2017, Aurelius entered the scene. That summer its 
flagship fund bought a large fraction of a certain series of unse-
cured Windstream notes—the “6 3/8 % Notes.”113 These Notes 
stood junior to approximately $2 billion of Windstream’s secured 
obligations and on par with, but maturing later than, more than 
$2 billion of other unsecured debt.114 The Notes traded at a dis-
count reflecting their junior status and the market’s concern over 
Windstream’s financial health. Aurelius was therefore able to ac-
quire its stake—$310 million face value of the 6 3/8 % Notes, 
amounting to approximately 6 percent of Windstream’s total out-
standing long-term obligations115—for what we estimate to be a 
little over $230 million.116 
Under the relevant indenture’s (standard) terms, a holder of 
more than 25 percent of the 6 3/8 % Notes can assert a covenant 
default and accelerate Windstream’s obligation to repay the prin-
cipal and accrued interest.117 Less than $600 million of 6 3/8 % 
 
 111 See Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *3–5; Thomas Declaration ¶¶ 24–
26 at *13–15 (cited in note 7). 
 112 See Thomas Declaration ¶¶ 8, 24 at *5, *13 (cited in note 7). 
 113 See Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *6. 
 114 See Windstream Holdings, Inc, Form 10-K, F-61 (SEC filed Mar 1, 2017) (“Wind-
stream 2016 Annual Report”), archived at https://perma.cc/9A6X-8HCL; Windstream 
Holdings, Inc, Form 10-K, F-72 (SEC filed Feb 28, 2018) (“Windstream 2017 Annual Re-
port”), archived at https://perma.cc/VN2H-FHKS. 
 115 See Windstream 2016 Annual Report at F-61 (cited in note 114). 
 116 We have no way of knowing when exactly Aurelius amassed its position or what it 
paid. We therefore use the volume-weighted average daily price of the 6 3/8 % Notes during 
the month before Aurelius revealed its position—that is, between August 21 and Septem-
ber 21, 2017. This is $0.75, based on TRACE data (on file with authors). Note that here 
and wherever we discuss TRACE data we followed the Dick-Nielsen method for cleaning. 
See generally Jens Dick-Nielsen, Liquidity Biases in TRACE, 19 J Fixed Income 43 (2009). 
 117 2013 Indenture § 6.01(a)(v) at *73–74 (cited in note 109): 
(a) Each of the following is an “Event of Default” with respect to the Notes: 
. . . 
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Notes were outstanding,118 meaning that Aurelius held far more 
than the requisite share, indeed a majority.119 Aurelius promptly 
asserted that spinning off Uniti breached Windstream’s sale-
leaseback covenant,120 and after some procedural wrangling, liti-
gation commenced in the Southern District of New York. 
Windstream denied that the spin-off had violated its covenant. 
But the company also sought to moot the significance of the ques-
tion. The relevant indenture, as is typical, allows the holders of 
more than 50 percent of the 6 3/8 % Notes to waive the conse-
quences of a default.121 That of course would be impossible as long 
as Aurelius held a majority. But the indenture also permitted 
Windstream to issue additional 6 3/8 % Notes. If it could dilute Au-
relius’s stake sufficiently, it could perhaps procure a majority to 
bless the spin-off retroactively. 
Windstream settled on a consent solicitation and exchange 
offer. It would offer existing creditors to swap their securities for 
newly issued 6 3/8 % Notes—conditional, it goes without saying, 
on the creditors’ consenting to waive the putative default.122 The 
ploy proved successful on its face. Windstream issued $560 mil-
 
(v) failure by the Company or any of its Restricted Subsidiaries for 60 days after 
written notice by the Trustee or Holders representing 25% or more of the aggre-
gate principal amount of Notes then outstanding to comply with any of the other 
agreements in this Indenture; . . . . 
See also id § 6.02(a) at *75: 
. . . If any other Event of Default occurs and is continuing with respect to Notes, 
the Trustee or the Holders of at least 25% in principal amount of the then out-
standing Notes may declare all the Notes to be due and payable immediately by 
notice in writing to the Company specifying the Event of Default. . . . 
 118 Windstream issued $700 million of the 6 3/8 % Notes in January 2013. But it re-
purchased some in 2016, so that by the summer of 2017, $585.7 million were outstanding. 
See Windstream 2016 Annual Report at F-61 (cited in note 114). 
 119 See Windstream 2017 Annual Report at F-72 (cited in note 114). 
 120 Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *6–7; Thomas Declaration ¶ 32 at *18 
(cited in note 7). 
 121 2013 Indenture § 6.04 at *76 (cited in note 109): 
Holders of a majority in aggregate principal amount of the Notes then outstand-
ing by notice to the Trustee may on behalf of the Holders of all of the Notes waive 
any existing Default or Event of Default and its consequences hereunder except 
a continuing Default or Event of Default in the payment of interest or Additional 
Interest on, or the principal of, the Notes. 
 122 For detail on the terms of Windstream’s consent solicitation and exchange offer, 
see Legal Analysis: Windstream Exchange Offers Face Aurelius Criticism over Bankruptcy 
Claim Value (Debtwire, Oct 30, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/RPY2-PXZH. 
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lion of new 6 3/8 % Notes, canceling $520 million of other outstand-
ing notes in the process, and so was able to procure a waiver by a 
slim margin.123 
Aurelius contested the waiver’s validity. The fund acknowl-
edged that new 6 3/8 % Notes could, if properly issued, dilute its 
vote; but it argued that the exchange offer was improper. The ar-
gument’s logic is intricate but worth rehearsing if only to show 
just how sensitive Aurelius’s position was to events beyond its 
control, even by its own lights. The argument goes generally as 
follows: 
1. Newly issued 6 3/8 % Notes count for voting purposes only 
if they are “Additional Notes.”124 
2. Additional Notes include only new notes issued in compli-
ance with § 4.09 of the indenture.125 
3. Section 4.09 prohibits Windstream and its restricted sub-
sidiaries from incurring indebtedness when their consoli-
dated debt-to-cash-flow ratio exceeds 4.5-to-1—which all 
acknowledge it did at the time of the exchange offer (condi-
tional on the spinoff counting as a Sale and Leaseback Trans-
action)126—except insofar as the indebtedness counts as “Per-
mitted Debt.”127 
4. The exchange offer increased indebtedness by $40 million, 
namely the difference between the $560 million in new 6 3/8 % 
 
 123 Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *8–9; Thomas Declaration ¶¶ 34–35 at 
*18–19 (cited in note 7). 
 124 2013 Indenture § 2.02 at *29 (cited in note 109). 
 125 Id § 1.01 at *1: 
“Additional Notes” means an unlimited maximum aggregate principal amount 
of Notes (other than the Notes issued on the date hereof) issued under this In-
denture in accordance with Sections 2.02 and 4.09 and having the same terms 
in all respects as the Notes, or similar in all respects to the Notes, except that 
interest will accrue on the Additional Notes from their date of issuance. 
 126 See Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *19–20. 
 127 2013 Indenture § 4.09(a) at *61 (cited in note 109) (emphasis in original): 
The Company shall not, and shall not permit any of its Restricted Subsidiaries 
to, directly or indirectly, Incur any Indebtedness; provided, however, that the 
Company or any of its Restricted Subsidiaries that are Guarantors may Incur 
Indebtedness, if the Company’s Consolidated Leverage Ratio at the time of the 
Incurrence of such additional Indebtedness, and after giving effect thereto, is 
less than 4.50 to 1. 
See also id § 4.09(b) at *61 (“Section 4.09(a) shall not prohibit the Incurrence of any of the 
following items of Indebtedness (collectively, ‘Permitted Debt’) . . . .”).  
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Notes and the $520 million of other notes retired in the ex-
change. So the new notes are not Additional Notes, and can’t 
vote on a waiver, unless they are Permitted Debt.128 
5. The only kind of Permitted Debt that arguably describes the 
new 6 3/8 % Notes is “Permitted Refinancing Indebtedness.”129 
6. Permitted Refinancing Indebtedness includes debt issued 
“in exchange for” other indebtedness of the company—a lim-
itation the new 6 3/8 % Notes satisfy—but only if the amount 
newly issued (that is, $560 million) does not exceed the 
amount being refinanced (that is, $520 million) plus accrued 
interest (not important here) and “the amount of any reason-
ably determined premium necessary to accomplish such refi-
nancing and such reasonable expenses incurred in connection 
therewith.”130 
7. Windstream stated in binding interrogatories that it paid 
no premium at all in the exchange.131 Therefore, the new 
6 3/8 % Notes are not Permitted Refinancing Indebtedness; 
are not Permitted Debt; are not Additional Notes; and so 
can’t vote to waive a default. 
The case thus turned on two legal issues. First, was the spin-
off a Sale and Leaseback Transaction? Second, if it was, had 
Windstream dodged the consequences of default by procuring a 
valid waiver? Judge Jesse Furman ruled for Aurelius on both 
questions. He concluded that the interposition of Windstream 
Holdings between Uniti and Windstream Services was an empty 
formality. Windstream Services’s continued “use and enjoyment” 
of the assets it had transferred to Uniti “walk[ed] like a lease and 
talk[ed] like a lease.”132 And Aurelius’s argument on the issue of 
 
 128 Id § 4.09(b) at *61. 
 129 Id § 4.09(b)(v) at *61: 
[allowing] the Incurrence by the Company or any Restricted Subsidiary thereof 
of Permitted Refinancing Indebtedness in exchange for, or the net proceeds of 
which are used to refund, refinance or replace Indebtedness (other than inter-
company Indebtedness) that was permitted by this Indenture to be Incurred un-
der Section 4.09(a) or clauses (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (xiv) or (xv) of this Sec-
tion 4.09(b)). 
 130 Id § 1.01 at *22. 
 131 See Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *21. 
 132 Id at *17. 
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waiver was sound. Judgment was entered for Aurelius, for $310 
million plus interest, on February 15, 2019.133 
3. The aftermath. 
Less than two weeks later, Windstream was in bankruptcy.134 
As its CEO, Tony Thomas, explained, the Aurelius judgment 
caused a default under Windstream’s other note indentures and 
more importantly under its credit agreement.135 The company 
kept very little cash on hand, relying instead on its revolving 
credit facility to finance day-to-day operations. The judgment 
thus meant that Windstream’s liquidity would be cut off unless a 
majority of its lenders voted to waive the default.136 But the lend-
ers were unwilling to give more than a brief respite.137 Other fi-
nanciers apparently offered to arrange a substantial out-of-court 
refinancing—the details are not public—but Windstream’s man-
agement didn’t think the necessary waivers and consents could 
be procured quickly enough, if ever, and the board concluded that 
Chapter 11 was the remaining option.138 
The value of Windstream’s securities tumbled. The price of 
its stock dropped from $3.37 on the eve of Judge Furman’s deci-
sion to just $0.45 when Windstream filed its Chapter 11 peti-
tion.139 Its notes plunged to around 20 cents on the dollar,140 set-
tling a month later at the CDS auction for 29.5 cents.141 In all, 
Windstream suffered a market-implied loss of enterprise value of 
approximately $1.7 billion.142 
 
 133 Id at *22–23. 
 134 See generally Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re 
Windstream Holdings, Inc, No 19-22312 (Bankr SDNY filed Feb 25, 2019). 
 135 Thomas Declaration ¶¶ 11–12 at *6 (cited in note 7). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id ¶ 39 at *20–21. 
 138 Id ¶¶ 39–44 at *21–22. 
 139 Windstream Holdings, Inc (WINMQ) (Yahoo Finance, Mar 1, 2020), archived at 
https://perma.cc/8X29-8P5A (reporting the stock price as of February 25, 2019, the date 
Windstream filed for bankruptcy). 
 140 Source: TRACE (data on file with authors). For more on our methodology, see note 116. 
 141 Windstream Services LLC Auction Results (Credit Fixings, Apr 3, 2019), online at 
http://www.creditfixings.com/CreditEventAuctions/results.jsp?ticker=WINDSSE (visited 
July 18, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 142 Source: Bloomberg (data on file with authors). 
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B. The Sabotage Interpretation 
One interpretation of the facts is that Aurelius attempted 
and performed a sabotage. On this interpretation, in addition to 
the Notes used to force litigation, the fund also bought some 
amount more than $310 million notional of CDS protection that 
would pay out if Windstream were to default. If the lawsuit were 
to succeed, the idea goes, the dominos would fall neatly for Aure-
lius. Windstream’s repayment obligation on more than $500 mil-
lion of long-term liabilities would be accelerated; its secured lend-
ers would spook about the prospect of so much cash flowing to 
nominally junior creditors and cut off lending; other junior lend-
ers would accelerate their own notes if the lenders did not; and 
Windstream would have to file for bankruptcy protection, crash-
ing debt prices and triggering CDS settlement obligations. In 
point of fact, more or less this sequence of events came to pass. 
The sabotage interpretation says that Aurelius planned on it and 
made a lot of money. 
This is the dominant interpretation. Windstream’s CEO, 
Tony Thomas, has made clear it is his. On the eve of bankruptcy, 
he declared that Windstream “believes Aurelius engaged in pred-
atory market manipulation to advance its own financial position 
through credit default swaps at the expense of many thousands 
of shareholders, employees, customers, vendors and business 
partners.”143 But Thomas is not alone. The view that Aurelius 
sought to drive down Windstream’s value and induce a credit 
event is the consensus view.144 
 
 143 Soma Biswas, Windstream Files for Bankruptcy After Legal Loss (Wall St J, Feb 25, 
2019), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/windstream-preparing-to-file-for-bankruptcy 
-as-early-as-Monday-11551113664 (visited Apr 5, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 144 See Matt Levine, Aurelius Wins Against Windstream (Bloomberg, Feb 19, 2019), online 
at https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-19/aurelius-wins-against-windstream 
(visited July 26, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (“[T]he universal assumption is that 
Aurelius has also bought a lot of credit-default swaps that will pay out if Windstream 
defaults on its debt: By pushing Windstream into default, Aurelius will make a profit on 
its CDS, even if it loses money on the bonds.”). See also Boris J. Steffen, The Evolution of 
CDS: From Net-Short Debt Activism to Manufactured Defaults, 38 Am Bankr Inst J 22, 62 
(Nov 2019) (“The litigation between Aurelius Capital Management LP and Windstream 
Holdings Inc. is an illustration of the net-short debt-activist strategy.”) (citation omitted); 
Carl N. Wedoff and Michael K. Ballew Jr, Outrageous Fortune: Making Money by Engi-
neering Defaults, 38 Am Bankr Inst J 36, 70 (July 2019) (“In 2017, Aurelius began pur-
chasing [Windstream debt], and market participants believed that the firm built a large 
CDS position as well.”); Stephen Lubben, CDS Strikes Again (Aurelius and Windstream) 
(Credit Slips, Feb 24, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/JZ76-LQA8 (concluding that 
“damage to Windstream will actually increase the value of [Aurelius’s] CDS position”); 
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C. The “Breach Tax” Interpretation 
An alternative interpretation is also possible. The facts are 
as consistent with an Aurelius strategy seeking to, in effect, tax 
Windstream for its covenant breach as they are with the sabotage 
theory. Such a breach tax strategy would not have been particu-
larly novel. Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock identified 
it more than a decade ago,145 and Wachtell Lipton’s restructuring 
lawyers attest to its continued appeal.146 
The idea of a “breach tax” strategy is to punish violations af-
ter the fact without undermining profitable operations. The con-
ventional remedy assigned to bondholders for an issuer’s breach 
of covenant is acceleration. In case of a breach, the bondholders 
or the indenture trustee can send the issuer a notice of default 
and, if the issuer fails to cure the breach, demand immediate re-
payment of principal.147 Acceleration is, however, historically un-
common. Trustees of their own accord scarcely if ever assert de-
faults other than for nonpayment. Acceleration for breach of other 
covenants thus happens only if the holders of 25 percent of the 
relevant bonds demand it. But widely scattered investors may 
 
Tiffany Kary, Emma Orr, and Eliza Ronalds-Hannon, Hedge Fund and Rural Phone Com-
pany Face Off in Court over Debt Drama (Bloomberg, Dec 13, 2017), online at https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-13/aurelius-and-windstream-s-game-of-debt 
-chess-heads-to-court (visited July 29, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting “Aure-
lius’ ulterior motives (i.e., CDS position)”); Windstream’s Grim Refi Prospects and Aurelius 
Sideshow Bring Recovery Valuations to the Forefront (Debtwire, Oct 2, 2017), online at 
https://www.debtwire.com/intelligence/view/prime-2512261 (visited July 29, 2020) (Perma 
archive unavailable) (reporting that Aurelius “holds CDS tied to the credit”). 
 145 See Kahan and Rock, 103 Nw U L Rev at 283–306 (cited in note 18). See also 
Yadav, Debt Buybacks at *20–23 (cited in note 25) (discussing recent episodes where this 
strategy was used). 
 146 See Cohen, Kleinhaus, and Sobolewski, Default Activism (cited in note 14). The 
authors call the strategy “greenmail.” Id. Whether it merits a pejorative label is, however, 
an open question. The strategy has a disciplinary function with presumably at least some 
systemic benefits. Corporate managers may take advantage of bondholders’ coordination 
problem. The threat that a hedge fund may solve that problem tomorrow disciplines manag-
ers today. For an analysis of an analogous monitoring function of greenmail in the equity 
context, see Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corpo-
rate Greenmail, 95 Yale L J 13, 29–31 (1985). That said, as Professors Kahan and Rock 
have shown, the acceleration remedy is poorly calibrated to the economic injury a partic-
ular breach produces. The remedy encourages sometimes too much and sometimes too 
little enforcement, see Kahan and Rock, 103 Nw U L Rev at 301–02 (cited in note 18), and 
hedge fund activism presumably reflects those incentives for better and worse. 
 147 See Kahan and Rock, 103 Nw U L Rev at 302 (cited in note 18) (“Economically, the 
acceleration remedy resembles a liquidated damages clause where the amount of liqui-
dated damages is equal to the difference between par and the nonaccelerated bond 
value.”); Kahan, 77 NYU L Rev at 1049 (cited in note 69). 
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find coordination difficult and so fail to accelerate or extract com-
pensatory concessions even if coordination would be to their col-
lective advantage.148 As a result, issuers have traditionally been 
more complacent about breaking covenants than a naïve observer 
might suppose. 
With respect to bonds trading below par, an activist hedge 
fund can supply the coordination and capture some of its value. 
To do so, the fund quietly buys up the relevant bonds in the sec-
ondary market. When it holds more than 25 percent, it threatens 
the issuer with acceleration unless the issuer pays the fund to go 
away.149 
The economics point to a mutually advantageous settlement. 
This is so because the value to the issuer of preventing accelera-
tion will frequently be greater than the value to the activist of 
causing acceleration. Acceleration forces the issuer (in effect) to 
buy back at par an entire series of bonds worth something less 
than par, but the activist captures only a fraction of that differ-
ence corresponding to its share of the bonds. To illustrate, sup-
pose that Issuer has $4 million of bonds outstanding. They trade 
at $0.75. Activist buys up 25 percent of them—$1 million face 
value—for $750,000 and contemplates suit. If Activist acceler-
ates, Issuer must (in effect) buy back $3 million worth of bonds 
for $4 million; but Issuer receives only a quarter of the million-
dollar premium. Issuer and Activist should thus settle for some-
thing between $250,000 and $1 million.150 
An activist fund pursuing a breach-tax strategy may, but 
need not, procure CDS protection. We have so far described the 
strategy as applied to an obvious and uncontested breach. Some-
times, however, the issuer will dispute allegations of breach, and 
litigation might follow. Judicial process takes time. Meanwhile, 
the fund is carrying a large (long) position in the issuer’s bonds. 
 
 148 See Kahan, 77 NYU L Rev at 1054–55 (cited in note 69). 
 149 See Kahan and Rock, 103 Nw U L Rev at 295–98 (cited in note 18). 
 150 A recent decision out of the US District Court for the Southern District of New 
York holds that so-called make-whole premiums payable to bondholders when an issuer 
chooses to redeem the bonds before they mature must also be paid when bondholders 
choose to accelerate repayment after an issuer defaults. Wilmington Savings Fund Society 
v Cash America International, Inc, 2016 WL 5092594 *8 (SDNY). See also Mitu Gulati and 
Marcel Kahan, Cash America and the Structure of Bondholder Remedies, 13 Cap Markets 
L J 570, 570–72 (2018). The decision expands the universe of bonds on which an activist 
can profitably seek to impose a breach tax. Until Cash America, profitable opportunities 
existed only with respect to bonds trading at a deep discount to par. Now it may be open 
season on bonds trading near or even at par. See Cohen, Kleinhaus, and Sobolewski, De-
fault Activism (cited in note 14). 
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If the issuer prevails, the fund will have been exposed to the 
bonds’ price movements over the duration of the trade. The fund 
might be happy to take on that risk. But exposure to price move-
ments is not fundamental to the strategy. The strategy is about 
the legal significance of some specific action the issuer has taken, 
not about the issuer’s general economic prospects. So, the fund 
may wish to buy CDS protection at the same time it establishes 
its bond position. In the strategy’s purest form, the amount of pro-
tection perfectly hedges the bonds’ exposure. 
D. Weighing the Alternatives 
Which strategy is Aurelius more likely to have pursued in 
Windstream? We think the evidence suggests, although it doesn’t 
prove, that Aurelius sought to impose a breach tax. The reason is 
that the economics would have appeared much better in the sum-
mer of 2017. A breach-tax strategy would have offered a solid re-
turn at low cost and with almost no downside risk. A sabotage 
strategy, by contrast, could have been expected to fetch a huge 
return if successful, but it also would have been easy to thwart 
and entailed large losses upon failure. We cannot, of course, say 
definitively what Aurelius did. The consensus interpretation may 
be correct. But it seems to us that the strength of rumor is the 
only reason to think so. 
1. The futility of sabotage. 
How would Aurelius in 2017 have looked at the prospect of 
sabotage? Let’s first consider the costs and benefits to the fund 
assuming its sabotage were to prove successful. 
The best-case scenario Aurelius would have contemplated is 
highly speculative. No one claims to know just how big a net-short 
position Aurelius established (if any). Moreover, the return to suc-
cessful sabotage depends on factors that are hard to predict ex 
ante—including macroeconomic variables such as interest rate 
changes, as well as target-specific factors such as operational suc-
cess. It is therefore impossible to say exactly how much Aurelius 
could have reasonably hoped to make from sabotage. That said, 
some simple arithmetic can approximate the way this strategy 
would have paid out in fact. 
A general model of the return to successful sabotage has 
three components: (1) the net amount the saboteur gains from its 
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CDS, minus the net amount it loses on both (2) its debt instru-
ments and (3) the out-of-pocket and opportunity costs of prosecut-
ing the sabotage. For simplicity, we can set aside item (3). This 
item is similar to, although systematically larger than, the cost of 
imposing a breach tax.151 So let’s think about items (1) and (2). 
Start with the CDS. Because we don’t know how much pro-
tection Aurelius is supposed to have bought, it will be useful to 
express returns as a percentage of each dollar invested. At the 
CDS auction held after Windstream’s bankruptcy filing, Wind-
stream’s debt obligations settled at a price of $0.295.152 Aurelius, 
like all protection buyers, would therefore have received $0.705 
per notional dollar of protection purchased.153 To procure protec-
tion, Aurelius would have paid an upfront fee and a quarterly pre-
mium of 1.25 percent. The average upfront fee for Windstream 
CDS between August 21 and September 21, 2017, when Aurelius 
presumably would have entered its swaps, was $0.29. The run-
ning premiums from summer 2017 until Windstream’s bankruptcy 
would have come to $0.075.154 Subtracting the costs of procuring 
CDS from its ultimate payout in 2019 would leave Aurelius with a 
net return of approximately $0.34 per notional dollar of CDS pro-
tection bought. 
Now consider the loss Aurelius would have taken on its 
6 3/8 % Notes. As we have said, a sensible estimate puts the Notes’ 
average cost to Aurelius at $0.75.155 Assuming the fund unwound 
its position in the CDS auction, as it would have reason to do if it 
was net-short,156 Aurelius realized $0.295 on their disposition. 
 
 151 Sabotage systematically requires more capital because it requires the activist to 
carry the same amount of debt as a breach tax does plus strictly more CDS protection. 
 152 Windstream Services LLC Auction Results (cited in note 141). 
 153 Id. 
 154 The dates of quarterly CDS premium payments have been standardized. Premi-
ums are due on the twentieth of March, June, September, and December. See Jennifer 
Grady, Jon Kibbe, and Julia Lu, Understanding the New Standard North American Credit 
Default Swap: Evolving Documentation and Market Practice (Richards Kibbe & Orbe LLP, 
Mar 18, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/4BNJ-EJ76. Depending on when exactly Au-
relius is supposed to have entered its swap positions, it would have had to pay five or six 
quarterly payments. Needless to say, Aurelius could not have known how long litigation 
would last. 
 155 See note 116 and accompanying text. 
 156 If Aurelius was net-short, it would have wanted the price of Windstream’s debt to 
settle as low as possible at auction. By selling its Notes in the auction, Aurelius could 
increase the supply of Windstream debt, which in turn can be expected to drive down its 
price. 
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The Notes’ coupon over the duration of the trade returned approx-
imately $0.095.157 Subtracting the returns from the Notes from 
the cost of procuring them, we find that Aurelius lost approxi-
mately $0.36 per dollar of Notes it held. 
The return to sabotage thus would have depended entirely on 
the amount of CDS procured. If Aurelius bought exactly as much 
CDS protection as it held in Notes, then, just as theory would pre-
dict, the strategy would have returned approximately zero.158 We 
know Aurelius had roughly $310 million of 6 3/8 % Notes,159 imply-
ing a loss on that half of the trade of some $112 million. If Aurelius 
bought CDS protection in a notional amount of, say, two or three 
times the size of its Note position, it would have realized a net gain 
of approximately $99 million or $204 million, respectively.160 
But sabotage threatens the activist with large losses if it is 
unsuccessful. If no credit event comes to pass or the target’s debt 
appreciates in value, the upfront fee for CDS protection is lost. If 
Aurelius bought a notional amount of three times the size of its 
Note position, for example, the upfront fee it would have had to 
put at risk would have come to some $270 million.161 This is just 
a way of saying that a saboteur makes a directional bet on the 
target’s fortunes. Taking a short position is in itself neither un-
reasonable nor objectionable. But by definition a saboteur’s justi-
fication for going short is its belief that it can cause the target to 
decline in value, not simply that the market has overvalued the 
target’s debt. In thinking about Aurelius’s position in the summer 
of 2017, one wants to gauge whether it might have thought its 
ability to cause Windstream to lose value and default justified 
putting $100 million or more at risk. 
We think not. Consistent with our discussion in Part II, 
Windstream had at least three means to block Aurelius and im-
pose a loss. Aurelius would not, presumably, have been able to 
foresee all of the precise details, but the outlines, because they 
apply generally, would have been clear enough. 
 
 157 Three coupon payments would have come due: February 1, 2018; August 1, 2018; 
and February 1, 2019. 
 158 More precisely, the strategy is expected to return just about the risk-free interest 
rate on the notional amount. See, for example, Feldhütter, Hotchkiss, and Karakaş, 121 J 
Fin Econ at 4 (cited in note 48). 
 159 Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *22. 
 160 Two times Note position: ($620 million)*(0.34) – ($112 million) = $99 million. 
Three times Note position: ($930 million)*(0.34) – ($112 million) = $204 million. 
 161 (0.29)*($930 million) = $270 million. 
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First, CDS protection sellers could have funded whatever li-
quidity Windstream would have needed to pay an adverse judg-
ment. As we have said, the best-case judgment Aurelius could 
have hoped to win—the judgment it won in fact—amounts to an 
order allowing the fund to put its below-par-value Notes to Wind-
stream for par. The maximum incremental liquidity Windstream 
would need to be able to finance such a judgment is thus the dif-
ference between the Notes’ par and market values. In the summer 
of 2017, this difference was, as we have said, approximately $78 
million.162 So, in expectation, CDS protection sellers would be able 
to forestall an Aurelius-induced bankruptcy for no more than that 
amount. This figure is an outside limit, because it assumes that 
Windstream’s existing investors would contribute nothing to the 
cause. 
How realistic would the prospect of protection-seller financ-
ing be? In his declaration supporting Windstream’s Chapter 11 
petition, CEO Thomas noted that, after the judgment but before 
the bankruptcy filing, a consortium of financial institutions pro-
posed a financing package that would have kept Windstream out 
of bankruptcy.163 We don’t know the details. We don’t know how 
attractive the offer was, nor whether protection sellers were be-
hind it. But the offer’s timing is suggestive. The point is not that 
a responsive financing deal was inevitable; but that Aurelius had 
no reason in 2017 to think a consortium couldn’t form to block 
sabotage. 
Second, Windstream could execute a consent solicitation and 
exchange offer. Windstream tried that and botched the attempt. 
But Aurelius had no way of knowing it would. Windstream’s debt 
exchange failed because the company increased its indebtedness 
by $40 million and declared in binding interrogatories that the 
incremental debt did not count as a “reasonably determined pre-
mium necessary to accomplish” a refinancing.164 In retrospect, 
 
 162 $310 million – $232 million = $78 million. See notes 170–71 and accompanying 
text. 
 163 Thomas Declaration ¶¶ 45–48 at *23–24 (cited in note 7). See also Declaration of 
Nicholas Leone in Support of Debtors’ Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders Pur-
suant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363, 364, 503, and 507 (I) Authorizing the Debtors to 
Obtain Senior Secured Superpriority Postpetition Financing, (II) Granting Liens and Su-
perpriority Administrative Expense Claims, (III) Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, 
(IV) Granting Adequate Protection, (V) Modifying the Automatic Stay; (VI) Scheduling a 
Final Hearing, and (VII) Granting Related Relief, In re Windstream Holdings, Inc, No 19-
22312, ¶¶ 11–12 *6–7 (Bankr SDNY filed Feb 26, 2019) (discussing the offer). 
 164 See text accompanying notes 130–31. 
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that declaration looks not only unwise as a matter of litigation 
strategy, but also probably incorrect. One feels for the law-firm 
associate who presumably drafted it. Aurelius could not have 
known that Windstream and its other creditors would conspire to 
block a sabotage but fail to apprehend the significance of the rel-
evant indenture’s restrictions on new indebtedness. Moreover, for 
all Aurelius could have known, Windstream might have per-
suaded its creditors to accept a debt exchange without paying 
them a consent fee. In retrospect, because the exchange creditors’ 
claims ultimately dropped by much more than $40 million,165 such 
a deal would have been good for all involved. 
Finally, Aurelius could not have known in August 2017 that 
if it were to win a judgment, Windstream would free fall into 
bankruptcy. In any event, that’s exactly what happened. Wind-
stream filed its Chapter 11 petition without any plan in place for 
what it would accomplish in bankruptcy or when or how it would 
emerge. Investors’ perception that Windstream had no idea what 
to do about the judgment against it presumably depressed its debt 
prices. Ordinarily when a company faces a potential bankruptcy, 
it tries to line up substantial support from creditors. Whether 
through informal canvas or with a formal restructuring support 
agreement, getting creditors to commit to a concept for the reor-
ganization minimizes the duration and uncertainty of bank-
ruptcy.166 The expectation that a debtor would arrange for the con-
tingency of a bankruptcy ought to be all the greater in the case of 
a perceived sabotage. The theory of sabotage-induced bankruptcy 
is that creditors other than the saboteur are satisfied, if not 
pleased, with the target’s performance. It should thus be rela-
tively easy in a sabotage case to generate support for a fast pro-
ceeding that aims only, or at least primarily, at dealing with the 
saboteur. Windstream did nothing of the sort. But Aurelius 
couldn’t have predicted that. 
A detail that emerged only after the litigation ended seems to 
buttress the view that Aurelius did not seek sabotage. Shortly af-
ter Judge Furman entered judgment, Windstream issued a state-
ment noting the company’s disappointment in and surprise at the 
ruling.167 Aurelius responded with a press release of its own. The 
 
 165 Source: Bloomberg (data on file with authors). 
 166 See Baird, 91 Am Bankr L J at 603–04 (cited in note 100) (discussing the rise of 
restructuring support agreement use). 
 167 Windstream Holdings, Inc, Press Release, Windstream Statement on Court Ruling 
in Bondholder Dispute (Intrado, Feb 15, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/YUA5-3CCR. 
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statement attracted attention for its apparent gloating. But the 
statement did something more. It suggested that settlement had 
been a viable option for Windstream. “We take no pleasure in 
Windstream’s [ ] financial predicament,” Aurelius began. Then 
came the interesting bit: 
Windstream could easily have averted it—first by not playing 
fast and loose with its noteholders in 2015, hoping nobody 
would hold the company to account, and second by settling. 
Instead, Windstream wasted an exorbitant amount—more 
than would have been needed to settle with us at the time—
on an ineffective exchange offer and then on litigation.168 
But why would Aurelius have offered to settle for an amount 
less than the cost of Windstream’s exchange offer and litigation 
tab? If the fund’s goal was to provoke a liquidity crisis to drive 
down Windstream’s bond prices and force a credit event, then set-
tling would have been counterproductive. If, on the other hand, 
Aurelius simply sought to tax Windstream’s covenant breach, 
then settling for an amount greater than the litigation’s expected 
value to it, but less than the expected cost to Windstream, would 
have made good sense. 
2. The promise of a breach tax. 
How would the economics of a breach-tax strategy in Wind-
stream have looked to Aurelius in August 2017? Consider first the 
anticipated costs of pursuing it. The 6 3/8 % Notes were trading, 
as we have said, in the neighborhood of 75 cents on the dollar.169 
Aurelius acquired roughly $310 million face value of them.170 A 
fair estimate of its total outlay, then, is $232 million.171 If Aurelius 
also wanted to hedge its exposure to the Notes’ value, bringing 
the risk of loss on the trade essentially to zero, the upfront fee for 
$310 million of CDS protection would have added $90 million.172 
 
 168 Aurelius Capital Management, LP, Press Release, Aurelius Responds to Wind-
stream’s Statement Regarding Court Decision (Cision, Feb 19, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/CV43-JQ47. 
 169 See note 116 and accompanying text. 
 170 Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *22. 
 171 (0.75)*$310 million = $232.5 million. 
 172 This number is the face value of notes Aurelius purchased ($310 million) multi-
plied by the average upfront fee for Windstream CDS between August 21 and September 
21, 2017 ($0.29 per notional dollar) (data on file with authors). See notes 152–54 and ac-
companying text. 
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These amounts would be tied up for the duration of the trade. In 
other words, Aurelius would have needed to consider the oppor-
tunity cost of investing $232 million or $322 million elsewhere for 
the trade’s duration. Aurelius would also have contemplated the 
out-of-pocket costs of litigation, principally legal fees. We can gen-
erously estimate these at $100,000 per month for the duration of 
the case. 
It is hard to say how long Aurelius should have expected to 
bear these capital and legal costs. In the event, litigation to a 
judgment took approximately eighteen months. It could have 
taken longer, but probably not a lot longer. The issues in the case 
concerned contract interpretation. They were thus good candi-
dates for swift resolution on a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment and, in any event, did not call for voluminous discovery. 
Moreover, Aurelius presumably expected to settle the dispute.173 
What about the expected benefits of a breach-tax strategy? 
These are harder to assess, because there are more contingencies. 
But it may be useful, by way of suggestion, to discuss two figures 
relevant to a settlement value: Aurelius’s expected recovery from 
litigating to judgment, and the amount Windstream seems in fact 
to have spent trying to end the litigation. 
 
 CDS prices are often quoted as a spread. We obtained the spreads in this case from 
CMAN (ICE Credit Market Analysis). The quoting convention reflects an outdated pricing 
structure. It used to be that protection buyers’ periodic premiums varied with the refer-
ence entity’s creditworthiness at the time of the swap. The spread was the key salient 
variable. Now, however, the periodic payment for high-yield CDS has been standardized 
at 5 percent, so pricing variability is reflected entirely in the size of the upfront fee a pro-
tection buyer must pay. To estimate the upfront fee in this case, we used the standard 
assumptions of Markit’s Spread Converter. 
 173 This presumes that Windstream would have been able to settle for a reasonable 
amount. That is, Aurelius could have hoped to extract a settlement only if Windstream 
had access to sufficient liquidity and freedom within the constraints of its debt contracts. 
It did. Windstream’s credit agreement placed a meaningful limit on the amount of distri-
butions the company could make to debtholders other than the lenders themselves. In 
particular, the credit agreement capped such a distribution at the amount of “available 
equity proceeds” and conditioned it on the maintenance of a two-to-one “secured leverage 
ratio.” See Sixth Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, § 6.08(b)(v) *93 (Apr 24, 2015), 
archived at https://perma.cc/2PB7-S8UA. But Windstream had plenty of room. We calcu-
late that in the third quarter of 2017, when Aurelius brought its suit, Windstream’s ca-
pacity was $3.33 billion, or two times the last twelve months’ operating income before 
depreciation and amortization (“OIBDA”) of $1.67 billion. Gross first-lien debt at the time 
totaled $3.01 billion. Windstream Holdings, Inc, Form 10-Q *22 (SEC filed Nov 9, 2017), 
archived at https://perma.cc/SJ5H-EQAT. Thus, Windstream appears to have been able, 
consistent with its credit agreement, to settle with Aurelius for up to approximately $320 
million [$3.33 billion − $3.01 billion = $320 million]. 
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The best-case scenario for Aurelius, if it litigated to a judg-
ment, would be to receive the par value of its Notes—that is, ap-
proximately $310 million.174 The net value of a total win would be 
that figure minus the strategy’s costs: $232 million needed to ac-
quire the Notes; legal fees of, say, $2 million; and the opportunity 
cost of Aurelius’s capital investment. Call it, then, $76 million mi-
nus capital costs. But the merits were uncertain. There was a sig-
nificant risk, if the parties litigated to judgment, that Wind-
stream would win and leave Aurelius a recovery of zero. 
Estimates of the merits are subjective. But suppose Aurelius 
thought it had a one-third chance of prevailing. That would peg a 
floor, for negotiation purposes, at, say, $25 million minus capital 
costs. That is, Aurelius might expect to settle for something be-
tween that figure and the cost to Windstream of an acceleration 
event. 
How much might Windstream have been willing to pay as a 
breach tax? One proxy is the amount the company paid in fact to 
try to moot the litigation. The consent solicitation and exchange 
offer described above was an effort to do just that. So how much 
did Windstream pay? The debt exchanges increased Wind-
stream’s indebtedness by some $40 million.175 The raw change in 
the company’s principal obligations is not the whole story, how-
ever. The offer was to exchange existing notes for new 6 3/8 % 
Notes.176 The existing notes paid higher coupons—some paid 
7.75 percent; others, 7.5 percent—meaning that by swapping into 
the 6 3/8 % Notes the exchanging noteholders were surrendering 
expected future interest. To capture the value paid by Wind-
stream to achieve the exchange, one therefore has to net Wind-
stream’s projected interest savings against its increased indebt-
edness. We calculate the net amount paid by Windstream to be 
$37.5 million.177 
Windstream presumably believed (incorrectly) that the ex-
change offer would moot litigation. For that reason, $37.5 million 
 
 174 See Windstream Services, 2019 WL 948120 at *22. 
 175 Id at *9. 
 176 Press Release, Windstream Announces Results of Consent Solicitations and Ex-
change Offers (Markets Insider, Nov 1, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/9ZEK-GYDX. 
See also Windstream Exchange Offers Face Aurelius Criticism (cited in note 122). 
 177 We compared, on the date of the exchange, the net present value of holding the 
relevant amount of 6 3/8 % Notes against the net present value of holding the relevant 
amount of old notes, using yield-to-maturity. Source: TRACE. 
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signifies both a floor and ceiling: a floor on the damage Wind-
stream believed Aurelius’s claim could do to it, and a ceiling on 
the amount for which it would be willing to settle. 
It would be vain to declare what value Aurelius would have 
placed on a breach-tax strategy in the summer of 2017, much less 
to describe the entire probability distribution it would have con-
templated. We have too little information. But our aim is not to 
exhaust all factors relevant to the likelihood and size of a settle-
ment. Our aim is more modestly to show that the economics of a 
breach-tax strategy look pretty good. A settlement in the neigh-
borhood of $30 million must have seemed reasonable. The strat-
egy’s cost would have been comparatively small, especially if, as 
was true of most leveraged credit-oriented funds during the rele-
vant timeframe, Aurelius’s alternative uses of capital were unat-
tractive.178 And with CDS protection, downside risk would have 
been close to zero. If, that is, Windstream wouldn’t settle and the 
judge were to hold that the Uniti spin-off was not a sale-lease-
back, Aurelius could simply unwind its positions and be down 
only legal fees. 
* * * 
We don’t know which bets Aurelius took relative to Wind-
stream. But neither does anyone else who has opined on the topic. 
The public facts are really very scant: Aurelius bought a large 
amount of 6 3/8 % Notes at a discount to par and then sued Wind-
stream for repayment of their full principal. The facts are con-
sistent with a well-known and (as we see it) risk- and cost-justified 
strategy. But public discourse has ignored the breach-tax strategy 
altogether. Instead, market participants and observers say it was 
sabotage, but in 2017 sabotage would have looked a very unlikely 
way to make money. If Windstream is the leading real-world il-
lustration of creditor sabotage, then the sabotage story’s plausi-
bility is doubtful. 
 
 178 See, for example, Allison McNeely and Katherine Doherty, Distressed Debt Trad-
ers Have Tons of Cash and Nothing to Buy (Bloomberg, July 19, 2019), online at https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-19/distressed-debt-traders-have-tons-of-cash 
-and-nothing-to-buy (visited at July 18, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
A. For Policy 
The principal policy implication of our analysis is negative. 
We conclude that net-short creditor sabotage poses no appreciable 
threat to operating companies. Either sabotage is so manifestly 
unprofitable in expectation that no one tries it, or else, more mod-
estly, it is a self-correcting problem because those who do try are 
systematically punished for doing so. If this is right, then it is 
unwise to change law to head off sabotage at the expense of other 
values. 
Proposals for legal reforms that curb creditor sabotage take 
two basic forms. One type would simply mandate greater disclo-
sure obligations for investors with cross-cutting economic inter-
ests.179 Under current law, hedge funds needn’t say much about 
their investments. Outside bankruptcy, they have no obligation 
to disclose debt ownership or positions in credit derivatives at all. 
Even in bankruptcy, disclosure requirements are minimal. Cred-
itors must file a proof of claim for all debts on which they hope to 
recover, but they needn’t disclose cross-cutting derivatives posi-
tions as a general matter.180 The idea of enhanced-disclosure pro-
posals is just to force net-short creditors to reveal themselves earlier 
than they otherwise might, so that companies and their net-long 
creditor allies can prepare for what they might later regard as 
antisocial enforcement. 
The other type of proposal goes a step further. More muscular 
proposals typically entail enhanced disclosure but also would cur-
tail the governance rights of hedged and net-short creditors. Net-
short creditors’ standard nonbankruptcy governance rights could 
be cabined with more aggressive credit documents. For example, 
a recently negotiated credit agreement involving Sirius Computer 
Solutions prohibits net-short syndicate lenders from voting on 
 
 179 See, for example, Bolton and Oehmke, 24 Rev Fin Stud at 2622–23 (cited in note 
53); Kevin J. Coco, Empty Manipulation: Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2019 and Ownership 
Disclosure in Chapter 11 Cases, 2008 Colum Bus L Rev 610, 637–38; Hu and Black, 156 U 
Pa L Rev at 734–35 (cited in note 3). 
 180 An investor who wishes to serve on a committee or participate in the bankruptcy 
as part of a group must disclose much more. See FRBP 2019. Additionally, the bankruptcy 
court can order discovery relevant to arguments for vote designation, equitable subordi-
nation, or equitable disallowance. 
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proposed amendments and waivers.181 The intended effect of such 
a provision is clear, even if important details remain to be worked 
out and may ultimately prove fatal.182 Changes to governance 
rights could also take place in bankruptcy. Professors Edward 
Janger and Adam Levitin, for example, have proposed what they 
call a “mark-to-interest” rule that would nullify net-short credi-
tors’ influence in Chapter 11.183 
Reform proposals have costs.184 Enhancing required disclo-
sures, in particular, would entail significant dislocations. (And 
disclosure of one kind or another is implied in proposals to alter 
governance rights.) Hedge funds make money by keeping their 
trading and investment decisions secret. Requiring them to share 
their positions would, if nothing else, change the terms on which 
they deploy capital. 
This is not to say that any particular intervention is a bad 
idea all told. Proposals for change might have substantial ad-
vantages well apart from their supposed impact on net-short sab-
otage. The idea of Professors Janger and Levitin to graduate vot-
ing power in Chapter 11 would substantially reduce rent-seeking 
by creditors holding multiple classes of claim, for example—as-
suming their system could be administered cheaply.185 We won’t 
try to give a full accounting here. The implication of our analysis 
is only that stamping out sabotage is not a reason to alter credi-
tors’ rights. 
 
 181 See Kristen Haunss, Sirius Computer Moves to Block Derivatives Holders from 
Speculation (Reuters, May 22, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/9V4L-JCMY. See also 
Levine, Maybe Companies Will Get Rid of CDS (cited in note 8) (discussing the provision). 
 182 See Williams, et al, Net Short Lender Disenfranchisement at *2–4 (cited in note 
10) (describing practical difficulties with the Sirius net short provision). 
 183 Janger and Levitin, 104 Iowa L Rev at 1906–16 (cited in note 13). See also CDSs 
and Bankruptcy (cited in note 63) (“Longer-term solutions rest on an overhaul of the bank-
ruptcy code and debt agreements to award votes and control based on net economic expo-
sure, rather than the nominal amount of debt owned.”); Hu and Black, 156 U Pa L Rev at 
735 (cited in note 3) (“[V]oting rights in bankruptcy may need to be based on net economic 
ownership instead of gross ownership of debt.”). 
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example, is considering one set of amendments already. But proposals to change CDS—at 
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a bankruptcy filing, see, for example, Hemel, Comment, 27 Yale J Reg at 167–69 (cited in 
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B. For Theory 
One of the live questions in reorganization and bankruptcy 
theory today concerns the significance for law of longstanding 
trends in capital markets and financial contracting. These trends 
are toward increasing liquidity, sophistication, and complexity. 
Distressed-debt markets are becoming more liquid; distressed-
debt investors are becoming more sophisticated; and the capital 
structures of distressed companies are becoming more complex. 
No one doubts the facts. But scholars disagree, sometimes explic-
itly but more often implicitly, about what the trends mean for op-
timal bankruptcy policy—in particular, what they mean for the 
relative status of contractual flexibility as against mandatory 
rules. 
Most theorists writing today think bankruptcy law should be 
concerned at least primarily with allocating assets to their highest-
value use.186 The open question is whether, given that aim, changes 
in corporate finance call for more or less judicial deference to ob-
served patterns of organization and contract. One cannot say a pri-
ori, even if one aims solely for efficient capital allocation, whether 
the law should police or otherwise limit the effect of innovations 
 
 186 In this sense, the character of the debate is different from that of the private -
ordering debate of the 1990s and 2000s. At issue then were the normative foundations of 
reorganization and especially bankruptcy law—whether it was a mere branch of contract 
interpretation or, alternatively, served other political functions. The practical question 
was the extent to which investors should be able to decide in good times how financial 
distress would be resolved in bad. But skepticism about contract was not so much about 
its capacity to deal with distressed companies efficiently. Rather, contract skeptics saw in 
bankruptcy a stabilizing economic institution and posited stability, or status-quo bias, as 
a positive good in competition with allocative efficiency. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, The 
Janus Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J Corp L 1, 5–9 (2018) (describing this conflict). 
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such as intercreditor agreements,187 restructuring support agree-
ments,188 claim trading in bankruptcy,189 and claim aggregation 
before bankruptcy.190 
Each innovation ought to be separately analyzed. The costs 
and benefits of every development are distinctive. At the same 
time, it is inevitable that—as in a pointillist painting—intuitions 
on discrete matters together will form a gestalt, and that one’s 
gestalt in turn informs intuitions on discrete matters. 
Taken at face value, the net-short creditor sabotage story is 
evidence of the capacity of financial engineering to yield predict-
ably pathological governance. It is also, for that reason, evidence 
for the view that optimal law may need increasingly to intervene 
to set aside the output of private ordering as markets develop.191 
Our analysis says this is wrong. Indeed, one draws exactly the 
opposite inference after examining the predicament of net-short 
creditors carefully. It is true that CDS considered in isolation can 
produce antisocial incentives. But along with those incentives 
come powerful disincentives, because investors are embedded in 
 
 187 See David A. Skeel Jr and George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Con-
tract Paradigm, 166 U Pa L Rev 1777, 1806–07 (2018); Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, 
and David A. Skeel Jr, Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 Nw U L Rev 255, 264–72 (2017); Ed-
ward R. Morrison, Rules of Thumb for Intercreditor Agreements, 2015 U Ill L Rev 721, 723. 
 188 See generally Baird, 91 Am Bankr L J 593 (cited in note 100). See also Edward J. 
Janger and Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring 
Support Agreements, 13 Brooklyn J Corp Fin & Comm L 169, 176–82 (2018). 
 189 See Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Claims Trading, 15 J Empirical Legal Stud 772, 
773 (2018): 
One group of scholars and lawyers . . . worry that claims trading destabilizes the 
bankruptcy negotiating process. . . . On the other hand, proponents of claims 
trading argue that claims trading makes bargaining more efficient by consoli-
dating smaller claims into the hands of larger holders and permitting activist 
investors to enter the firm’s capital structure. 
See also Victoria Ivashina, Benjamin Iverson, and David C. Smith, The Ownership and Trad-
ing of Debt Claims in Chapter 11 Restructurings, 119 J Fin Econ 316, 318 (2016); Adam J. 
Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of Claims Trading, 4 Brooklyn J Corp Fin & 
Comm L 64, 68–77 (2010); Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement: Trans-
parency Cost, Risk Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 Brooklyn J Corp Fin & Comm 
L 39, 44–45 (2009); Baird and Rasmussen, 119 Yale L J at 651 (cited in note 4); Frederick 
Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw U L Rev 1684, 1699–1705 (1996). 
 190 See Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chap-
ter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing, 8 J Legal Analysis 493, 493–94, 500 (2016). 
 191 See Casey, Colum L Rev at *1–4 (cited in note 28); Rasmussen and Simkovic, 10 
Harv Bus L Rev at 148–151 (cited in note 28); Ellias and Stark, 108 Cal L Rev at 784–86 
(cited in note 28); Ayotte, Disagreement at *2–6 (cited in note 28). 
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responsive markets. The liquidity of modern distressed-debt mar-
kets, considered dynamically, doesn’t exacerbate but instead 
ameliorates incentives to try sabotage.192 
C. For Rhetoric 
It’s worth asking why the creditor sabotage story is so popu-
lar, so readily digested, if its predicates are implausible and un-
observed. A partial explanation may lie in the superficial similarity, 
noted above, between sabotage and other activist tactics that aim 
to affect credit-derivative payoffs.193 But a deeper answer, we 
think, lies in the story’s rhetorical uses. Myths persist on account 
of the social and psychological functions they play, irrespective of 
literal truth.194 
We see three overlapping functions. Most obviously, the story 
is attractive to corporate managers. Sabotage is, after all, an al-
ternative to executive failure.195 It presupposes that another’s 
criminality, or at least bad faith, is to blame for whatever prob-
lems are manifest—not the executive’s own mismanagement. 
Sabotage thus at once supplies a reason for investors to give more 
leash than they otherwise might be inclined to do—after all, it’s 
irrational to blame management for unforeseeable shocks—and 
offers psychological comfort to the executive himself. So it is no 
accident that Windstream’s CEO, Tony Thomas, has been among 
the most aggressive proponents of the view that Aurelius engaged 
in “predatory market manipulation” to undermine the com-
pany.196 In this sense, cries of sabotage work in the creditor con-
text in much the same way as allegations of “short-termism” work 
relative to activist equity investors—as rhetorical sword and psy-
chological shield.197 
 
 192 See Buccola, 167 U Pa L Rev Online at 5–8 (cited in note 27); Adler, 166 U Pa L 
Rev at 1856–59 (cited in note 27); Schwartz, Bankruptcy Related Contracting at *1–2 (cited 
in note 27). 
 193 See note 76. 
 194 For an introduction and connection to corporate law, see generally Macey, Corpo-
rate Law Myths (cited in note 17). 
 195 See, for example, Marina Koren, Elon Musk’s Long Obsession with Sabotage (The 
Atlantic, June 19, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ETM8-YWA7. 
 196 Press Release, Windstream Holdings, Inc. Files for Voluntary Reorganization Un-
der Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code Following Judge Furman’s Decision (Feb 25, 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/YL8W-VG6U. 
 197 See Roe and Shapira, The Power of the Corporate Short-Termism Narrative at *4 
(cited in note 17). See also Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U Pa 
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Second, the story is attractive to distressed-debt investors. 
This is true not so much because the story’s telling yields practical 
benefits for them—the opposite is likelier—as because it confirms 
a certain self-conception. It hardly overstates things to say that 
distress investors revel in a Machiavellian ethos. As a rule, they 
prize intelligence and cunning over the principle of equal treat-
ment, and they want to inhabit a professional world in which the 
values they hold dear are rewarded and their opposites punished. 
In this sense, the net-short saboteur, with its superior skill and 
essential disregard for others, acts almost as a totem of the indus-
try, at once an ideal to strive toward and a warning of the fate 
that awaits insufficiently attentive investors. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the story encapsu-
lates and expresses a more general anxiety about financializa-
tion. Taken at a certain level of abstraction, net-short creditor 
sabotage is but one of many stories in circulation featuring 
wealthy and—okay—clever Wall Street figures willing to destroy 
Main Street business for a few dollars more. The complexity of 
the tactics, the esoteric instruments used, the element of surprise 
are reminiscent of a “heist” film inverted so that the villains make 
off with the loot. Each time the story is told, it confirms the truth 
of a more general, cynical perspective on what modern financial 
markets deliver. Maybe that fear is well justified, and maybe not. 
Viewed as myth, the net-short creditor sabotage story takes 
on new meaning. It becomes, in one sense, trivial to advocate that 
people stop telling the story. We think sabotage doesn’t exist as 
an empirical phenomenon, but that may hardly be the point. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have sought to show that the net-short 
creditor saboteur is an urban legend—a cautionary story widely 
circulated but lacking a substantial basis in fact. The problem 
with the story is not that it misapprehends the incentives of cred-
itors who buy large amounts of CDS protection, but rather that it 
ignores everyone else. Other actors with countervailing incentives 
have, we have argued, the means as well as the reasons to thwart 
attempted sabotage. And because this state of affairs is common 
knowledge, sophisticated investors would be rash to try it. Indeed, 
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the episode in which market watchers most confidently spot net-
short sabotage—Aurelius against Windstream—appears on closer 
examination to involve nothing of the sort. What in the end is most 
interesting about net-short creditor sabotage is not, therefore, the 
threat it poses to viable businesses but, like all folklore, the fact 
that the story continues to be told despite its implausibility. 
